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Abstract
We propose nonparametric definitions of absolute and comparative naivete.
These definitions leverage ex-ante choice of menu to identify predictions of future
behavior and ex-post (random) choices from menus to identify actual behavior.
The main advantage of our definitions is their independence from any assumed
functional form for the utility function representing behavior. An individual is sophisticated if she is indifferent ex ante between retaining the option to choose from
a menu ex post or committing to her actual distribution of choices from that menu.
She is naive if she prefers the flexibility in the menu, reflecting a mistaken belief
that she will act more virtuously than she actually will. We propose two definitions
of comparative naivete and explore the restrictions implied by our definitions for
several prominent models of time inconsistency.
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Introduction

Models of dynamic inconsistency play an important role in a wide-ranging set of economic
applications, and there is strong and increasing interest in the implications of naivete
where individuals mispredict their future behavior.1 While naivete often yields surprising
and significant consequences, so far these effects are usually understood within the context
of specific utility representations, where the existence and comparison of naivete are
defined and tested through parameters like discount factors or probabilities.
In this paper, we introduce general nonparametric definitions of naivete and sophistication, as well as comparative measures of naivete. We then characterize the implications
of these definitions for a broad class of utility specifications. Our behavioral definitions
leverage two pieces of choice data. First, we use preference for commitment to measure
anticipated behavior from an ex-ante perspective before the realization of temptation.
Formally, the individual’s preferences over different option sets (or menus) capture her
demand for commitment and allow an inference of her beliefs regarding her future behavior. Second, we use choices from option sets to measure actual behavior from an ex-post
perspective under the influence of temptation and after the level of commitment is fixed.
Since uncertainty about future behavior seems especially compelling under naivete and
is increasingly relevant in applied work, we formally accommodate this uncertainty by
modeling ex-post behavior as a random choice rule.
For a simple illustration of our approach, consider first an individual who makes
deterministic choices without randomization. Her ex-ante ranking of option sets is given
by a preference %, and her ex-post choice from any menu is given by a choice function C.2
When choosing between two options p and q, an individual may prefer p if committing
ex ante, {p}  {q}, yet choose q if given the option ex post, C({p, q}) = q. This pattern
is indicative of time inconsistency and has been documented in numerous contexts, for
example, preferences to maintain a healthy diet, decrease spending, or engage timely
effort in a difficult task that go unfulfilled ex post. Still, additional information is needed
to determine whether the individual is sophisticated or naive about this inconsistency.
If we also observe a strict preference to retain the option p ex ante, {p, q}  {q}, then
we can further infer that she (incorrectly) anticipates that p will be her ex-post choice
from the menu {p, q} and hence she is naive. Thus, observing preferences to retain the
1

A recent survey of empirical applications can be found in Section 2.1 of DellaVigna (2009) and a
survey of some theoretical applications in contract theory can be found in Kőszegi (2014).
2
We focus throughout the paper on choice functions rather than correspondences, which presumes the
individual uses some tie-breaking procedure to select between equally attractive options. Our primitives
for stochastic choice make similar implicit assumptions. Importantly, our results do not depend in any
way on how ties are broken. Hence, while our results can easily be extended to deal with choice correspondences (and their stochastic generalizations), it is a strength of the current analysis that knowledge
of the complete set of possible options that the individual is willing to choose from a menu is not required.
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flexibility of multiple options provides the additional information needed to delineate
between sophisticated and naive beliefs. Similarly, in the more general case of stochastic
choice, if p is chosen with probability α from the menu {p, q} at the ex-post stage,
then the relevant ex-ante comparison is between the menu {p, q} and commitment to
the appropriately weighted mixture {αp + (1 − α)q}. A strict preference for the former
indicates biased beliefs that overestimate the probability of choosing the ex-ante more
appealing alternative p to be greater than α.
Our behavioral definitions extend this approach to arbitrary choice sets. To test
absolute naivete and sophistication, we compare an individual’s predicted value for a
menu x of different options against the actual value of her ex-post choice C(x) from that
menu. Ex ante, a sophisticate correctly anticipates her future choice and is indifferent
between maintaining the flexibility to choose from x later or committing to her eventual
choice C(x) now, that is, x ∼ {C(x)}. In contrast, a naif mistakenly anticipates making
a more virtuous choice and prefers to maintain the flexibility in x, that is, x % {C(x)}.
In the case of uncertain temptations and random choice, we maintain this same basic
intuition by comparing her preference for the menu versus committing to the lottery over
outcomes induced by her distribution of choices.
Using one of the most comprehensive models of time-inconsistent preferences available, the random Strotz representation, we show that our behavioral definitions of sophistication and naivete characterize sharp and intuitive parametric restrictions. The
random Strotz model is general enough to include the majority of all utility representations for time-inconsistent preferences that appear in the applied literature,3 including
the naive quasi-hyperbolic discounting model of O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999, 2001) and
its stochastic extensions, and the parametric restrictions implied by our definitions boil
down to the functional-form restrictions that the literature has proposed for these models. Our first contribution is thus in unifying the different parametric notions of naivete
that have been explored for various models of time inconsistency by illuminating their
common underlying behavioral theme: underdemand for commitment.
Our second and most significant contribution is in developing behavioral definitions
of comparative naivete. Comparative measures of naivete rooted in choice behavior have
been essentially unexplored in the prior literature. Moreover, even restricting attention
to specific utility representations such as naive quasi-hyperbolic discounting, the proper
functional-form restrictions that capture increases in naivete are not fully understood
or agreed upon. In Section 2, we discuss existing proposals of parametric restrictions
for comparing naivete that have been suggested for the quasi-hyperbolic discounting
model, and we provide examples that demonstrate why these prior proposals may lead
3

One important exception is models that incorporate costly self-control. We apply our definitions
to the random self-control representation as an extension in Section 5.1, and we explore alternative
definitions of naivete for self-control preferences in a companion paper Ahn, Iijima, and Sarver (2016).
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to counterintuitive behaviors: An individual ranked as more naive according to one of
these statistics may nonetheless make better use of available commitment devices or be
less subject to exploitation in market interactions, behavior that strikes one as clearly
more sophisticated.
To avoid such counterintuitive possibilities, we take the opposite approach. Our
starting point is instead to consider the behavior that seems to most reasonably capture
increases in naivete. We explore two possible notions of comparative naivete. The first
is based on comparing underdemand for commitment. Using deterministic choice to
illustrate simply, a commitment to the singleton menu {p} is beneficial if {p}  {C(x)},
that is, if p is preferred ex ante to the outcome C(x) that would actually be chosen from
x. However, a naive individual may at the same time exhibit the ranking x  {p}, so
she strictly prefers to maintain the flexibility of x due to the mistaken belief that she
will ultimately make a more virtuous choice. Thus, a beneficial commitment is declined
if x  {p}  {C(x)}. Our first definition of comparative naivete is that an individual
is more naive than another if she declines more beneficial commitments. Our second
definition compares individuals’ believed and actual indirect utilities from menus and
classifies an individual as more naive if the difference between her ex-ante anticipated
utility from x and her utility from the actual choice C(x) is larger. This comparison
manifests behaviorally as a greater willingness to overpay for the menu x, and hence the
overvaluation of menus provides another natural metric for naivete. In the case of random
choice, both comparative definitions extend by replacing the deterministic choice with the
induced lottery over outcomes. We characterize the parametric restrictions corresponding
to each of these definitions within the random Strotz model, show how the two definitions
are related, and discuss when each might be most appropriate.
Our paper is related to two strands of literature. In the empirical literature on time
inconsistency and naivete, our use of ex-ante and ex-post choice behavior has several
precedents. DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) study both the choice of gym membership, which determines the feasible set of attendance/payment pairs, and subsequent
attendance levels; Shui and Ausubel (2005) observe consumers’ choices of credit card contracts and their subsequent borrowing behavior; Giné, Karlan, and Zinman (2010) offer
subjects commitment contracts that incentivize smoking cessation and later test whether
or not the subjects smoked; Kaur, Kremer, and Mullainathan (2015) allow subjects to
choose wage contracts that constrain their feasible future effort/consumption pairs and
then observe actual effort ex post; Augenblick, Niederle, and Sprenger (2015) ask subjects
to choose an intertemporal allocation of effort and a probability of being committed to
it and then observe whether subjects wish to revise that plan when the first date of task
completion arrives. Not only do these papers use similar choice data, but those that test
for naivete identify it using behavior that is closely related to our definition.
Our work also relates to papers in decision theory that use behavior at different time
3

periods to capture sophistication under time inconsistency, as surveyed by Lipman and
Pesendorfer (2013). Noor (2011) considers preferences in a recursive domain that includes
ex-ante and ex-post choice as projections; he pioneered the approach of using temporal
choice as a domain for explicitly testing the sophistication implicitly assumed in most
ex-ante axiomatic models of temptation. Kopylov (2012) relaxes Noor’s sophistication
condition and considers agents who choose flexibility ex ante that is subsequently unused
ex post. Kopylov eschews mistaken or naive beliefs, but rather interprets the relaxation
of sophistication as reflecting a direct psychic benefit of maintaining positive self-image.
Finally, Dekel and Lipman (2012) observe that ex-ante and ex-post choice can be combined to empirically distinguish random Strotz representations from others that involve
costly self-control. Much of the technical apparatus from Dekel and Lipman (2012) ends
up being useful in studying naivete, as we will explain in the body of the paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we use the special
case of quasi-hyperbolic discounting to illustrate some of the problems with existing
proposals and to outline our approach. Then, the following sections contain our formal
results. We begin with the special case of deterministic choice in Section 3 to introduce
and ground concepts, and then move on to the more general case of stochastic choice in
Section 4. Finally, Section 5 discusses several extensions of our analysis.

2

Examples and Motivation

We preview our definitions by focusing attention to the naive quasi-hyperbolic discounting
model introduced by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999, 2001). In this model, the agent would
ideally discount future utility by the factor δ. But she is tempted by instantaneous
gratification and at the time of choice will discount the future by an additional presentbias factor β, leading to overconsumption in the present and underconsumption in the
future relative to her ideal plan. If she is sophisticated, she correctly anticipates this
present bias. The innovation of O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999, 2001) is to allow the
agent to incorrectly anticipate the magnitude of present bias and instead believe that she
will use the present-bias factor β̂.
As suggested by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999, 2001), sophistication is intuitively
captured by the parametric restriction β̂ = β, while naivete is captured by β̂ ≥ β.4
We provide foundations for these parametric restrictions. Our proposal for a behavioral
criterion for sophistication is that the decision-maker is indifferent between choosing from
a menu of available options and committing to the particular option that she will actually
choose from that menu, correctly anticipating her future choice. Our criterion for naivete
is that she prefers the menu to her eventual selection, incorrectly anticipating making a
4

Here, we mean (weak) naivete to include the boundary case of sophistication.
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more virtuous choice. We show that these criteria are respectively equivalent to β̂ = β
and β̂ ≥ β for the quasi-hyperbolic model. Moreover, we demonstrate that these criteria
also correspond to intuitive restrictions in a broad class of models extending beyond
quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Our contribution to understanding absolute naivete is in
providing behavioral foundations that apply across a variety of models, thus illuminating
a common structure that they share.
While the notion of absolute naivete for a single quasi-hyperbolic agent is relatively
unambiguous, how to compare naivete across individuals is more controversial. In the
literature, various notions of “more naive” have been proposed for the quasi-hyperbolic
model. For example, DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) and Bousquet (2017) suggest
an agent is more naive if the statistic β̂ − β is greater, while Augenblick and Rabin (2015)
β̂
suggest an agent is more naive if the statistic 1−
is smaller. These proposals appear
1−β
intuitively plausible at first glance, but the following examples suggest that an agent
ranked as more naive according to these statistics may nonetheless engage in behavior
that seems patently more sophisticated.

2.1

Problems with Existing Approaches

To illustrate the counterintuitive behaviors associated with existing proposals for comparing naivete, we use two examples. The first is a stylized consumption-savings problem
where the agent is given the opportunity to advantageously place assets in an illiquid
account as a commitment device for saving. Illiquid savings instruments that preempt
instantaneous gratification seem among the most canonical and oft-mentioned examples
of policy interventions motivated by insights from behavioral economics, so they seem like
a natural first test of how well different rankings perform under real-world applications.
Example 1 (Consumption-savings problem). Consider two risk-neutral individuals facing a consumption-savings problem. The agents are quasi-hyperbolic discounters with a
common discount factor δ = 1, a common period 0 (ex-ante) utility function ui (c1 , c2 ) =
c1 + c2 , and period 1 utility functions vi (c1 , c2 ) = c1 + βi c2 . Both individuals are strictly
naive. At date 0, individual 1 believes that her future β equals β̂1 = 0.9, while the true
value is β1 = 0. Individual 2 believes that her future β equals β̂2 = 0.98, while the true
β̂2
β̂1
< 1−
, so agent 1 would be
value is β2 = 0.9. Note that β̂1 − β1 > β̂2 − β2 and 1−
1−β1
1−β2
considered more naive under the discussed parametric proposals.
In period 0, both individuals are endowed with unit wealth of 1 dollar and have the
opportunity to commit to a savings plan which forces them to save all consumption until
period 2. This commitment plan has an interest rate of 2%. If they refuse the savings
plan, then in period 1 they have the opportunity to save for period 2 and earn 3% interest;
in other words, they face the choice set x = {(c1 , (1.03)(1 − c1 )) : 0 ≤ c1 ≤ 1} at date 1.
5

Since βi × 1.03 < 1 for i = 1, 2, both individuals would decide to consume all their
endowment immediately in period 1 if given the opportunity: Ci (x) = (1, 0) for i = 1, 2.
Consider now the behavior of the agents at date 0. Since β̂1 × 1.03 < 1, individual 1
correctly anticipates that C1 (x) = (1, 0). Preferring the consumption plan (0, 1.02) to the
consumption plan (1, 0), she therefore commits to the forced savings plan at date 0. In
contrast, since β̂2 × 1.03 > 1, individual 2 believes that she will select (0, 1.03) from x,
and thus she forgoes the profitable commitment opportunity (0, 1.02). In this decision
problem, individual 1 perfectly forecasts her future behavior without commitment, while
individual 2 optimistically believes she will save her income when in fact she will not.
So although individual 1 would be considered more naive than individual 2 by some
parametric criteria in the literature, its seems insensible to call individual 1 more naive
than individual 2.

Example 1 illuminates that some existing comparisons will lead to scenarios where
the supposedly more naive individual accepts the commitment device and leaves herself
better off, while the supposedly more sophisticated individual rejects the advantageous
commitment and instead ends up consuming a worse alternative. In the next example,
adapted from DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004), we show that these proposals also lead
to scenarios where the individual deemed as more sophisticated will be subject to more
exploitation from a profit-maximizing monopolist. This is because the difference between
the anticipated value and the actual value of a contract for the purportedly “more naive”
individual is in fact less than than the difference for the “more sophisticated” individual.
Example 2 (Monopoly profit). A monopolist produces a service whose consumption
results in delayed benefits, for example, a fitness club offers access to exercise that provides
future health benefits. The firm offers a two-part tariff at period 0 that specifies (L, p)
where L is a fixed payment like monthly dues for gym membership and p is the price of
using the service like a per-visit fee at the gym. The consumer decides at date 0 whether
to accept the contract. If she accepts, the consumer decides at date 1 whether to use
the service. Both payments L and p are made at date 1, but the benefits of the service
are not realized until date 2. Specifically, if the consumer uses the service at date 1, she
receives a delayed benefit b at date 2. The cost of providing the service equals c for the
firm. We assume that b > c, meaning that the surplus from the service is positive. The
utility received by the consumer if she does not take up the contract is normalized to 0.
Now consider a quasi-hyperbolic consumer (β̂, β, δ), and take δ = 1 for simplicity.
Suppose that the consumer considers the contract (L, p). She anticipates using the service
in date 1 if and only if β̂b ≥ p. Therefore, at date 0, she accepts the contract if and only
if
− L + (b − p)1β̂b≥p ≥ 0.
(1)

6

The firm knows (β̂, β) and offers a contract (L, p) that maximizes its expected profit of
L + (p − c)1βb≥p ,

(2)

subject to Equation (1). The inequality in Equation (1) must be binding since otherwise
the firm could raise L and increase its profits. This pins down the value of L as a function
of p, L = (b − p)1β̂b≥p . Substituting this value into the profit function in Equation (2)
yields
(b − p)1β̂b≥p + (p − c)1βb≥p ,
which simplifies to
(b − c)1βb≥p + (b − p)1β̂b≥p>βb .
|
{z
} |
{z
}
social surplus

(3)

overvaluation

The first term in Equation (3) is the social surplus generated from the contract, and
the second term captures the consumer’s overvaluation of the surplus that she will receive
from the contract due to her underestimation of her future impatience. Now consider two
quasi-hyperbolic discounters such that β̂1 = 1, β1 b > c > β2 b, and β̂2 > β2 is sufficiently
close to β2 to imply that individual 2 would be considered less naive than individual 1
based on either of the measures β̂ − β or (1 − β̂)/(1 − β). Since β1 b > c, it is easy to see
from Equation (3) that the profit-maximizing contract to individual 1 is the same as the
optimal contract under sophistication (for instance, L = b − c, p = c), and individual 1
does not incur any welfare loss due to her naivete. But since β2 b < c, the firm can earn
more than the total social surplus by offering an exploitative contract to individual 2
that sets a price p = β2 b +  for some small  > 0. This exploitative contract guarantees
that individual 2 naively accepts the contract in anticipation of using the gym, but in
actuality does not use the service ex post.5 This example shows that the firm’s ability to
exploit the consumer’s misprediction is not monotonic in either β̂ − β or (1 − β̂)/(1 − β),
but instead depends on the consumer’s overvaluation of contracts.6


2.2

Our Proposed Alternative

These examples demonstrate that existing parametric comparisons of naivete for the
quasi-hyperbolic discounting model may lead to situations where the individual forgoes
5

The use of an exploitative contract by the firm in this example does not rely on the assumption of
monopoly power. It is not difficult to show that introducing competition between firms will drive down
the fixed fee L, but firms will continue to set a price p that both deters individual 2 from using the
service ex post and causes her to have the incorrect ex-ante belief that she will use the service.
6
Note that in their related analysis, DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) fix the value of β. While this
example shows that monopoly profits are not, in general, monotone in the difference β̂ − β, in the special
case of fixed β our results will imply that increasing β̂ leads to an increase in overvaluations and hence
monopoly profits.
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a beneficial commitment or gives up more rents to a monopolist, despite being deemed
as more sophisticated. These examples were specifically motivated by and designed to
foreshadow our proposed nonparametric comparisons. We propose two approaches to
comparing naivete across individuals. In the first approach, we compare underdemand
for commitment and say an individual is more naive if she rejects more beneficial commitments than the other. Comparing demand for commitment is economically relevant
because commitment devices are often proposed as a policy intervention to manage selfcontrol problems, as in Example 1. In the second approach, we say an individual is more
naive if her overvaluation for a menu, measured as the difference between her anticipated
indirect utility and her actual indirect utility, is larger than the other’s overvaluation for
that menu. This approach is economically relevant because a monopolist can extract the
overvaluation through a fixed-fee component of a contract, as demonstrated in Example 2.
We will show in Section 3 that for the case of deterministic choice these two approaches
to comparing naivete converge, so an agent forgoes more advantageous commitments if
and only if she overvalues menus more. In particular, for the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model, comparing underdemand for commitment and comparing overvaluation both
yield the same parametric restriction: either β̂1 ≥ β̂2 ≥ β2 ≥ β1 , or individual 2 is sophisticated (β̂2 = β2 ). Note that this is more demanding than the mentioned criteria of
comparing differences or ratios of β̂ and β. That is, our criterion is less finely ordered and
leaves some pairs of individuals as unordered that these prior quantitative comparisons
would erroneously rank.

2.3

Stochastic Present Bias

Our general results compare the naivete of individuals who exhibit randomness in their
ex-post choices due to uncertainty about the nature or degree of time-inconsistency. The
relationship between our two suggested approaches to comparing naivete—comparing
underdemand for commitment and comparing overvaluation of menus—is more subtle
in the general case than suggested by the special deterministic case. When choice is
possibly random, the equivalence breaks down and the comparison of underdemand for
commitment is a strictly more demanding criterion than the comparison of overvaluations.
Here, we preview these differences by continuing to focus attention on quasi-hyperbolic
discounting. Consider a generalization of the (β̂, β, δ) model where the level of present
bias β is stochastic, governed by the cumulative distribution function (abbreviated as cdf)
F . To model naivete, the individual’s belief about her future behavior is also stochastic,
but governed by the distribution F̂ .
The standard extension of an order on a deterministic space to the space of beliefs
is through stochastic dominance. This turns out to nicely extend the absolute definition
of naivete. Recall that a deterministic quasi-hyperbolic discounter is naive if and only
8
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1
F1

F1

F2

F2
F̂2

F̂2
F̂1

F̂1

0

0

1

0

β

(a) Equations (4) and (5) are both satisfied.

0

1

β

(b) Equation (5) is satisfied, but not (4).

Figure 1: Comparisons of naivete for stochastic choice.

if β̂ ≥ β. We will show that a random quasi-hyperbolic discounter whose present bias
actually follows distribution F , but is believed to follow distribution F̂ , satisfies our
behavioral definition of naivete if and only if F̂ (β) ≤ F (β) for all β. That is, she is naive
if and only if her belief F̂ first-order stochastically dominates the distribution F .
While prior notions of comparative naivete were not without controversy in the case
of deterministic choice (as our prior examples illustrated), comparisons of naivete for
stochastic choice have been largely unexplored in the existing literature. Our results help
to remedy this gap. We will show that our two proposed criteria for comparing naivete
lead to novel parametric restrictions. First, an individual has greater underdemand for
commitment than another if and only if either
F̂1 (β) ≤ F̂2 (β) ≤ F2 (β) ≤ F1 (β)

(4)

for all β, or the second individual is sophisticated (F̂2 = F2 ). When each of these distributions is concentrated on a single value, this first-order stochastic dominance relationship
between the distributions specializes to the aforementioned restriction for the deterministic case: β̂1 ≥ β̂2 ≥ β2 ≥ β1 . Second, the comparison of overvaluations across individuals
yields a different, and more permissive, ordering in stochastic environments. We show
that an individual has greater overvaluation than another for every menu if and only if
F1 (β) − F̂1 (β) ≥ F2 (β) − F̂2 (β)

(5)

for all β.
Equation (5) is a strictly weaker restriction than Equation (4), as Figure 1 illustrates.
Thus, the approach of ranking naivete by the level of overvaluation is strictly more
9
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F1 F2

0

0

F̂2

β1 β2

β̂2

F̂1

β̂1

1 β

Figure 2: Equation (5) implies Equation (4) for degenerate distributions
(deterministic choice), provided β̂2 > β2 .

general and will order more pairs of individuals than the approach of ranking naivete
by underdemand for commitment. However, as noted previously, the two approaches
are equivalent in the special case of deterministic choice. When each distribution is a
deterministic Dirac measure, the differences Fi (β) − F̂i (β) can only take values of 1 or
0, and both of our parametric restrictions become equivalent to β̂1 ≥ β̂2 ≥ β2 ≥ β1 (or
β̂2 = β2 ). Figure 2 illustrates why these generally different orderings become equivalent
without randomness.
The following examples illustrate how our two comparative measures can be used in
practice. Example 3 shows that for some applications, the more permissive ordering of
naivete captured by Equation (5) is the appropriate comparative, and it is not necessary to resort to the more restrictive ordering of naivete from Equation (4). However,
Example 4 then illustrates that for other applications, our weaker ordering can lead to
counterintuitive behavior, and the more restrictive ordering is instead appropriate.
Example 3 (Monopoly profit with random choice). Consider the setting of Example 2,
the only difference being that the agent is a random quasi-hyperbolic discounter who
believes that her future β is distributed according the cdf F̂ , while the true distribution
is given by F . The incentive-compatibility constraint from Equation (1) is modified into
1

Z
−L+

(b − p) dF̂ (β) ≥ 0,

(6)

p/b

while the expected profit of the firm now equals
Z

1

(p − c) dF (β).

L+

(7)

p/b

Rewriting Equation (7) by substituting the value of L obtained in Equation (6) shows
10

that the firm’s expected profit equals
Z

1

Z

1

(b − p) d(F̂ (β) − F (β)) .
(b − c) dF (β) +
p/b
p/b
|
{z
} |
{z
}
social surplus

(8)

overvaluation

When F and F̂ have continuous cumulative distribution functions, the monopoly profit
can be written as

 p 
 p
 p 
(b − c) 1 − F
+ (b − p) F
− F̂
.
b } |
b
b }
|
{z
{z
social surplus

overvaluation

This final expression makes most clear why overvaluation is increasing in F (·) − F̂ (·),
although this is generally true even without a continuous cdf.

As mentioned, while Equation (5) is equivalent to comparing overvaluation, it is too
broad of a criterion to capture underdemand for commitment. That is, one individual
might have greater overvaluations for all menus, yet fail to exhibit greater underdemand
for commitment. Instead, to compare take-up of commitment devices, the appropriate
parametric restriction is the one in Equation (4). We illustrate this point by revisiting
the consumption-savings problem from Example 1, but with a simple stochastic element.
Example 4 (Consumption-savings problem with random choice). As in Example 1,
suppose x = {(c1 , (1 + r)(1 − c1 )) : 0 ≤ c1 ≤ 1}. The savings commitment plan forces
savings and has a return rc , giving consumption (1 + rc ) in period 2. Individuals i = 1, 2
have no present bias (β = 1) with probability θi and have the common present bias
parameter β = β ∗ with the remaining probability 1 − θi .7 The individuals have naive
beliefs that they will instead have no present bias with probability θ̂i ≥ θi and will have
present bias β ∗ with probability 1 − θ̂i . The scope for naivete is thus in overoptimism
about the probability of avoiding present bias, and not in the level of that present bias if it
actualizes. Assuming β ∗ (1 + r) < 1, individual i will therefore choose (c1 , c2 ) = (0, 1 + r)
with probability θi and (c1 , c2 ) = (1, 0) with probability 1 − θi . Denote the vector of
expected values of actual consumption from x in each period by
cθi = (1 − θi , θi (1 + r)),
and likewise let cθ̂i denote the anticipated expected values of consumption from x. Since
the utility functions are linear in consumption, the actual ex-ante expected utility for an
That is, Fi (β) = 0 for β ∈ [0, β ∗ ), Fi (β) = 1 − θi for β ∈ [β ∗ , 1), and Fi (1) = 1. This simple binary
model of stochastic temptation was previously studied by Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) and Chatterjee and
Krishna (2009).
7
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(a) Expected values of consumption for
perceived and actual stochastic choice.
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(b) Individual 2 mistakenly forgoes the
savings commitment device.

Figure 3: Stochastic naivete and the uptake of savings commitment devices.

individual is therefore8
(1 − θi ) + θi (1 + r) = 1 + θi r.
Given her naive beliefs, individual i instead anticipates utility 1 + θ̂i r from the menu x.
Suppose
rc
rc
> θ1 , θ2
and
θ̂2 >
> θ̂1 .
(9)
r
r
The first inequality implies that rc > θi r for i = 1, 2, so both individuals would benefit
from the savings commitment device. The second inequality implies that individual 2
will forgo the commitment device, while individual 1 will make use of the device. Thus, 2
exhibits greater underdemand for commitment than 1 in this decision problem. However,
it is easy to see that the parameter restrictions in Equation (9) can be satisfied even
when individual 2 has lower overvaluations than 1, that is, when θ̂2 − θ2 ≤ θ̂1 − θ1 . This
example demonstrates that individual 2 can have lower overvaluations than individual 1,
yet still exhibit greater underdemand for commitment.9 Figure 3a illustrates anticipated
and actual expected values of consumption that satisfy these conditions together with
the ex-ante indifference curve through the commitment consumption plan (0, 1 + rc ). 
Note that the basic argument in Example 4 applies to any perceived and actual
cumulative distributions functions for present bias factors β that violate Equation (4).
To illustrate, suppose Fi and F̂i are continuous for i = 1, 2 and let β ∗ = 1/(1 + r). Then,
when confronted with the consumption-savings problem from this example, individual i
8

Risk neutrality is assumed in this example for expositional simplicity, but is in no way central to the
main qualitative conclusions. Our main results neither require nor assume risk neutrality.
9
In contrast, Equation (4), which corresponds to θ̂1 ≥ θ̂2 ≥ θ2 ≥ θ1 in this example, is incompatible
with Equation (9) and hence requires that individual 1 have greater underdemand for commitment.
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will choose to save with probability θi = 1−Fi (β ∗ ), but naively believes that she will save
with probability θ̂i = 1 − F̂i (β ∗ ). Thus, by Equation (9), if (r − rc )/r < F1 (β ∗ ), F2 (β ∗ )
then the savings commitment device is beneficial to both individuals, and if F̂2 (β ∗ ) <
(r − rc )/r < F̂1 (β ∗ ) then individual 2 passes up this beneficial commitment device and
only individual 1 utilizes it. Figure 3b illustrates how this is possible even in the case
where individual 1 has greater overvaluations than individual 2.10
The main distinction between the two previous examples is that in Example 3, the
monopolist can design a custom contract for each individual in the population using
knowledge of their distributions F and F̂ . This assumption is reasonable if the population is roughly homogeneous or if the firm has detailed consumer data on potential
customers. In this case, the exploitation of an individual due to naivete is increasing in
her overvaluations (equivalently, the parametric comparison in Equation (5)). In contrast, Example 4 considers the welfare impact of a single fixed policy instrument offered
across an entire population of individuals who might be heterogeneous in their distributions F and F̂ . In this case, the welfare loss due to naivete increases with greater
underdemand for commitment (equivalently, Equation (4)), but not necessarily in the
level of overvaluations. Thus, which of our two proposed comparisons of naivete is most
suitable depends on the specifics of the information structure and whether contracts (or
commitment devices) are designed at the individual or population level.

3

Deterministic Choice

We begin our analysis by examining naivete in the context of deterministic choice and
beliefs. The next section will study the more general environment of random choice. We
feel that random choice is an important consideration given that naivete regards possibly
incorrect beliefs about future behavior. For now, this section focuses on the special case
of deterministic choice to establish intuition and avoid some of the additional technical
details required to formalize random dynamic inconsistency. While some insights are
general and extend to the random case, others are interestingly limited to deterministic
choice and have subtle variations when considering random choice.

3.1

Primitives

We study a two-stage model with an agent who initially decides on a menu of several
options and subsequently selects a particular option from that menu.
10
As might be evident, another possibility when Equation (4) fails to hold is that F̂1 (β ∗ ), F̂2 (β ∗ ) <
(r − rc )/r and F1 (β ∗ ) < (r − rc )/r < F2 (β ∗ ). In this case, both individuals pass up the savings
commitment device, but this decision is only a mistake for individual 2.
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Let C be a compact and metrizable space of outcomes. Let ∆(C) denote the set of
lotteries (countably additive Borel probability measures) over C, with typical elements
p, q, . . . ∈ ∆(C). When it causes no confusion, we slightly abuse notation and write c
in place of the degenerate lottery δc ∈ ∆(C) supported on c. Let K(∆(C)) denote the
family of nonempty compact subsets of ∆(C) with typical elements x, y, . . . ∈ K(∆(C)).
These sets are interpreted as menus or budget sets. The menu determines the level of
flexibility versus commitment, with larger menus providing more flexibility and smaller
menus providing more commitment. An expected-utility function is a continuous function
u : ∆(C) → R such that u(αp + (1 − α)q) = αu(p) + (1 − α)u(q) for all lotteries p, q. A
function is nontrivial if it is not constant. We write u ≈ v when u and v are expectedutility functions and u is a positive affine transformation of v. For a fixed expected-utility
function u and menu x, let Bu (x) ≡ argmaxp∈x u(p).
We consider a pair of behavioral primitives. The first primitive is a preference relation % on K(∆(C)), with indifference ∼ and strict preference  defined as usual. This
primitive provides insight into the agent’s projection regarding her future behavior. The
behavior encoded in % is taken before the direct experience of temptation but while (possibly incorrectly) anticipating its future occurrence. This is an economically important
primitive, because it also captures demand for commitment, which is an important consideration when analyzing commitment instruments without mandatory take-up. The
second primitive is a (deterministic) choice function C : K(∆(C)) → ∆(C).11 This is the
standard model for economic choice, and it records the individual’s actual choices from
menus while experiencing temptation.

3.2

Absolute Naivete

We now introduce our nonparametric definition for absolute naivete. In a nutshell, an
individual is naive if she overvalues a menu relative to the actual choice that she would
ultimately make from that menu.
Definition 1. An individual is sophisticated if x ∼ {C(x)} for all menus x. An individual
is naive if x % {C(x)} for all menus x. An individual is strictly naive if she is naive and
not sophisticated.
A sophisticated individual correctly anticipates choosing C(x) from x. A naive individual erroneously overvalues the option to retain the other alternatives in x, thinking
that her final choice will be more virtuous than C(x). Many decisions that open or
11

Note that all of our definitions and theorems can be modified to accommodate choice correspondences
instead of choice functions. We choose to work with choice functions in order to make our primitives as
undemanding as possible in terms of richness of the required choice data.
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restrict future options can be modeled as menus and can therefore be related to our definitions. For example, purchasing an unlimited gym membership can be modeled as the
option set that includes any number of monthly visits, each paired with the fixed cost
of the membership. Similarly, many financial decisions, like opening a line of credit or
placing savings in an illiquid retirement account, can be viewed as adding or removing
options from future decisions. In these examples, we argue that some consumers may
strictly prefer x to C(x), indicating a lack of sophistication in the form of excess optimism
about their future choices. The examples in Section 2 provide concrete illustrations of
such violations of sophistication. Of course, the opposite violation with overdemand for
commitment, where {C(x)}  x, is also potentially interesting and certainly indicates a
violation of sophistication (in this case, in the form of excess pessimism). Many of our
results have straightforward analogous statements with appropriate changes in signs for
this opposite case. However, this direction receives less attention and seems less empirically relevant, so we focus our analysis on traditional naivete in the form of underdemand
for commitment throughout the paper.12
Our definition of sophistication is similar to the Independence of Redundant Alternatives axiom that Gul and Pesendorfer (2005) use to study deterministic choice in a
finite-outcome setting, but our definition of naivete has not been considered in the literature.13 After presenting the main result of this section, we will discuss the connection
to other related papers, most notably Noor (2011), and we will also touch on some of the
assumptions implicit in our definition.
The ubiquitous Strotz model of dynamic inconsistency offers a general application
for these concepts. The sophisticated Strotz model is specified by two preferences. The
first is her ex-ante commitment preference over future consumption, as represented by
the utility function u. The second is her temptation preference that governs her actual
consumption choices at the ex-post stage, as represented by the utility function v. Naivete
requires divergence between believed and actual consumption. Specification of a naive
Strotz individual therefore requires a third preference to capture her possibly erroneous
beliefs about her future behavior, as represented by the utility function v̂.14
Definition 2. A Strotz representation of (%, C) is a triple (u, v, v̂) of nontrivial expectedutility functions such that the function U : K(∆(C)) → R defined by
U (x) = max u(p)
p∈Bv̂ (x)
12

What is difficult and we leave open is what happens when violations of sophistication are not
uniformly in the same direction, so {C(x)}  x for some menus x and {C(y)} ≺ y for other menus y. We
suspect that not much can be said in that case, at least not using the techniques in this paper.
13
Grant, Kajii, and Polak (2000) and Siniscalchi (2011) employ similar ideas to formalize sophistication
in different settings of belief updating.
14
Recall that a utility function is nontrivial if it is not constant, and Bv (x) = argmaxq∈x v(q).
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is a utility representation of % and
C(x) ∈ Bu (Bv (x)).
While she anticipates maximizing v̂, a naive Strotzian agent’s ex-post behavior C
actually maximizes v. Note that both the domain of choice and the representation itself
are quite general. For example, C could be a set of infinite-horizon consumption streams,
and hence quasi-hyperbolic discounting (β-δ preferences) is a special case of the Strotz
representation (see Section 3.4).
The following result demonstrates that our behavioral definition of naivete characterizes sharp parametric restrictions on v̂ and v. A naive individual believes that her
future behavior will be more virtuous than it actually is. For the parameters of the
Strotz model, this means that the anticipated temptation utility v̂ is more aligned with
the commitment utility u than the actual utility v that will govern future consumption.
The alignment has a specific structure: v̂ is a linear combination of u and v, that is,
v̂ ≈ αu + (1 − α)v.15 The belief v̂ puts additional unjustified weight on the normative
utility u, but aggregates u with v in a linear manner. Other cases where the believed
temptation differs from the actual temptation in a less structured way are also allowed
in our primitives and correspond to a form of misprediction, but these cases fail to satisfy our proposed behavioral test of naivete. For example, our definition excludes an
individual who actually will be tempted to indulge in sweet treats but believes she will
be tempted to indulge in salty treats. This structure also relies crucially on the linear
structure of the domain of lotteries and the assumed expected-utility functions.
Definition 3. Let u, v, v̂ be expected-utility functions. Then v̂ is more u-aligned than v,
written as v̂ u v, if either v̂ ≈ αu + (1 − α)v for some α ∈ [0, 1] or v ≈ −u.
Any strict convex combination of u and v is more u-aligned than v. One case that
is tedious is when v = −u because u and −u have, up to positive affine transformations
and excluding trivial preferences, no convex combinations except u and −u themselves.
We therefore adopt as convention that any expected-utility function is more u-aligned
than −u, since −u is maximally divergent from u.16
Theorem 1. Suppose (%, C) has a Strotz representation (u, v, v̂). Then the individual is
naive if and only if v̂ u v (and is sophisticated if and only if v̂ ≈ v).
15

Recall that v̂ ≈ αu + (1 − α)v means that v̂ is a positive affine transformation of αu + (1 − α)v and
hence the two functions share the same set of maximizers.
16
Incorporating this special exception for this boundary case into the definition of the order u also
tidies the conclusions of the following characterization theorems, that would otherwise have to read
“v̂ u v or v ≈ −u.”
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Theorem 1 is a special case of one of the main results of Section 4 (see Theorem 3),
where we turn to the more general case of random choice and uncertain beliefs.
We close this section with a discussion of several important assumptions that are
implicit in our definitions of sophistication and naivete, which will also help to further
clarify how this paper connects with the related literature. First, our definitions assume
there is not a nontrivial preference for flexibility, that is, there is no uncertainty about
what constitutes virtuous behavior. Suppose an agent faces no temptation but is unsure
what her future tastes will be. Then she may prefer to keep the flexibility of the menu
rather than be forced to choose ex ante, in order to maintain the option value of waiting
to see what taste realizes. While the possibility of uncertain normative preferences is
substantively important, we suppress that consideration here and focus attention exclusively on misprediction of temptation.17 Throughout this paper, we implicitly assume
that the normative preference or taste has already been realized or is known to the decision maker. Of course, in many policy applications, balancing the benefits of flexibility
and of commitment is important, as in deciding penalties for early withdrawals from retirement accounts. However, even a parametric model of naive choice with both kinds of
uncertainty is still outstanding. Section 5.2 discusses some of these issues in more depth.
Second, in our definition, inferring sophistication from x ∼ {C(x)} assumes consequentialism, that is, the individual is indifferent between committing to her (correctly)
anticipated choice C(x) from x at the ex-ante stage and selecting the menu x with the
belief that she will choose C(x) ex post. Put differently, adding or removing unchosen
options has no effect on the evaluation of a menu. In contrast, an individual who exerts
costly willpower to avoid choosing tempting options as in Gul and Pesendorfer (2001)
does not evaluate a menu only by its choice consequences. In this case, she may strictly
prefer to remove these unchosen temptations.18 In Section 5.1, we show that if individuals can exert costly self-control then our behavioral test of naivete can lead to false
negatives, but not false positives: Satisfying our definition of naivete in the presence of
costly self-control implies a fortiori that the individual is naive; however, violating our
definition of naivete does not preclude the possibility that an individual with Gul and
Pesendorfer (2001) preferences is in fact naive.
Since our definitions do not tightly characterize sophistication and naivete in the
case of the self-control preferences of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), a natural question is
whether a tight characterization is in fact possible. The answer is affirmative, but only
in the case of deterministic choice. As an axiom en route to characterizing a recursive
17

Ahn and Sarver (2013) characterize sophistication for the case of uncertain normative preferences
and demand for flexibility, rather than the demand for commitment that arises with temptation, and
propose the failure to anticipate future preference realizations as a form of unforeseen contingencies.
18
Alternatively, an agent that derives self-satisfaction from exercising willpower may strictly prefer to
include tempting options that she will not consume.
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model of temptation, Noor (2011) proposes a definition of sophistication for the selfcontrol model.19 Noor’s definition requires that whenever {p}  {q} (that is, p is the
preferred ex-ante commitment), p is the unique ex-post choice from the menu containing
both lotteries if and only if {p, q}  {q}. While not intended for the consequentialist
models we have in mind in this paper, there is nonetheless a close connection between his
sophistication condition and the one proposed in this paper when applied to the Strotz
model. A companion paper, Ahn, Iijima, and Sarver (2016), modifies the definition of
sophistication from Noor (2011) to provide a tight behavioral characterization of naivete
for both deterministic self-control preferences and deterministic Strotz preferences. In
that paper, it is shown that Noor’s definition of sophistication is equivalent to the one
in our Definition 1 for Strotz preferences, but the two definitions diverge for self-control
preferences. Moreover, that paper extends Noor’s work by proposing a definition of
naivete and characterizing a recursive model of self-control that allows for naivete as well
as sophistication. However, Ahn, Iijima, and Sarver (2016) also show that a tight characterization of naivete is impossible when self-control and random choice are simultaneously
permitted; this impossibility result is closely related to the lack of unique identification
of parameters in a random self-control representation. In contrast, Definition 1 in this
paper extends easily to the case of random choice and characterizes sophistication and
naivete within the random Strotz model, as we will establish in Section 4.

3.3

Comparative Naivete

In this section, we introduce two definitions for comparing naivete across individuals.
The first naturally extends our proposed test for absolute naivete by comparing the sets
of forgone opportunities for beneficial commitment. The second directly measures the
difference between anticipated and actual indirect utilities for menus. We show that, in
the deterministic case, both definitions turn out to be equivalent.
Recall that a naive agent satisfies x % {C(x)}, that is, there is a potential gap between
her value for the menu x and the value of her eventual choice C(x). To compare the
degree of naivete across agents, our first definition measures the size of this gap using
underdemand for commitment.
Definition 4. Individual 1 is more naive than individual 2 if, for all menus x and
lotteries p,
x 2 {p} 2 {C2 (x)} =⇒ x 1 {p} 1 {C1 (x)}.
Any singleton {p} that is ex-ante ranked strictly between a menu x and its resulting
choice {C(x)} presents a welfare-enhancing commitment that will be unfortunately declined: p is preferred ex ante to C(x) yet the individual chooses to maintain the flexibility
19

A variation of this axiom is also used by Kopylov (2012).
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of x due to the naive belief that she will make a more virtuous choice. Thus, the beneficial
opportunity to commit to consuming p instead of C(x) will be naively rejected. Definition 4 classifies an individual as more naive than another if she has greater underdemand
for commitment, that is, if she forgoes more beneficial commitments. Singleton menus
like {p} are especially useful in comparing naivete because there is no ambiguity about
the eventual choice from such menus.20
Our second proposal for comparing naivete is based on the utility difference between
a menu x and the actual choice C(x). In many applications of time inconsistency and
naivete to industrial organization and contract theory, the firm’s ability to extract excess
surplus is tied to the extent to which the individual overestimates the utility that she
will receive from a set of options or from an action-dependent contract.21 For example,
if a monopolist can charge a fixed fee, then it can extract the difference between the
anticipated and actual indirect utility for a contract, above the standard extraction of
the social surplus. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 5. Suppose (%, C) has a Strotz representation (u, v, v̂). The coefficient of
overvaluation of a menu x is defined by:
OV (x) =

max u(p)
| {z }
p∈Bv̂ (x)

believed indirect utility

−

max u(p).
{z
}
|
p∈Bv (x)

actual indirect utility

Our second definition of comparative naivete requires that OV1 (x) ≥ OV2 (x) for all
menus x, reflecting the idea that individual 1 makes a larger mistake when she contemplates her future behavior than individual 2. Early in this paper, Example 2 studied a
monopolist designing contracts for naive agents. There, the coefficient of overvaluation
appeared in the monopolist’s profit in Equation (3), where it was interpreted as the extra
profit, above and over the standard social surplus, extracted by the monopolist because
of the agent’s mistaken beliefs. Thus, another way to interpret this comparison is that
a monopolist can extract more excess surplus from individual 1 (above social surplus)
than from individual 2. Note that even without the assumption of quasilinear preferences
20

By definition, an agent is less naive if she takes better advantage of full commitments, that is, of
singleton commitments. However, this does not imply that a less naive individual will make better use of
partial commitment devices. That is, suppose x ⊂ y and C(x)  C(y), but x is not a singleton. Then it is
entirely possible for the more naive agent to take up the beneficial partial commitment (x  y), while the
less naive agent forgoes that partial commitment (y  x). Several models in the literature demonstrate
that naive individuals may mistakenly pay (in the form of money, effort, or foregone options) for partial
commitment devices that are too weak to actually be effective, e.g., Heidhues and Kőszegi (2009). In
these situations, becoming less naive in the sense of Definition 4 may make an individual worse off: She
becomes sophisticated enough to recognize the potential benefits of commitment, but not sophisticated
enough to recognize that a partial commitment will leave temptations that she will be unable to resist.
21
Some applications are reviewed in Spiegler (2011) and Kőszegi (2014, Section 6).
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that was used in Example 2, this measure OV (x) of overvaluation has cardinal meaning
because we consider lotteries and expected-utility preferences.
Underdemand for commitment provides one criterion for comparing naivete. Overvaluations provide another criterion. The following theorem shows that both approaches are
equivalent in the deterministic setting. It also shows that these comparisons of naivete
for two individuals are equivalent to a direct restriction on the parameters of the Strotz
representations for those individuals.
Theorem 2. Suppose (%1 , C1 ) and (%2 , C2 ) are naive and have Strotz representations
(u, v1 , v̂1 ) and (u, v2 , v̂2 ). Then the following are equivalent:
1. Individual 1 is more naive than individual 2.
2. OV1 (x) ≥ OV2 (x) for all menus x.
3. v̂1 u v̂2 u v2 u v1 , or v̂2 ≈ v2 (individual 2 is sophisticated).
Theorem 2 is a corollary of our more general results for stochastic choice in Section 4
(see Theorems 4 and 5).
When comparing a pair of naive individuals, individual 1 always has greater underdemand for commitment whenever individual 2 is sophisticated. This is because individual 2
never forgoes a beneficial commitment, thus rendering the required implication in Definition 4 vacuously true. That is, all sophisticated individuals are less naive than all naive
individuals. In all other cases, where both individuals are strictly naive, the last condition in Theorem 2 imposes sharp and intuitive restrictions on the believed and actual
temptations of both agents in the Strotz model: While they share common normative
preferences over singleton commitments, individual 1 is more optimistic about her future
behavior than individual 2, as reflected in the requirement v̂1 u v̂2 . However, individual 1’s actual ex-post choices are even less virtuous than individual 2’s choices, as
reflected in v2 u v1 . A more naive individual is more optimistic about the virtuousness
of her future behavior while actually exercising less virtue. In our view, since naivete
concerns the difference between believed and actual behavior, v̂ and v, both parameters
should be implicated in comparing naivete.22 Geometrically, Figure 1 illustrates that if
individual 2 is strictly naive then comparative naivete implies that both individuals’ anticipated temptations v̂i and actual temptations vi are convex combinations of the shared
commitment utility u and the more naive individual’s actual temptation v1 , progressively
located on the arc connecting u and v1 .
22

See also Lemma 3 in the appendix, which shows that with shared commitment preferences, individual 1 is more naive than individual 2 if and only if she is less temptation averse and rejects more
commitments ex ante (that is, {p} 2 x whenever {p} 1 x) and she makes less virtuous choices from
every menu ex post (that is, {p} 1 {C(x)} whenever {p} 2 {C(x)}).
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Figure 4: Alignment of believed and actual utilities implied by comparative naivete
in the deterministic Strotz representation, in the case where individual 2
is strictly naive (Theorem 2).

As suggested in Section 2 and formally proven in Section 4, with random choices,
while having greater underdemand for commitment will imply having higher overvaluations, the converse fails and one can have higher overvaluation without having greater
underdemand for commitment. That is, in general, comparing naivete through underdemand for commitment is a more strenuous criterion that orders fewer individuals than
comparing overvaluations, and the equivalence stated in Theorem 2 fails to generalize to
random choice.

3.4

Application to Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting

To illustrate the usefulness of our definitions, in this subsection we consider their implications for the ubiquitous quasi-hyperbolic discounting model. These applications extend
the insights observed in the examples in Section 2.
Let C = [a, b]N be a set of infinite-horizon consumption streams, with elements
c = (c1 , c2 , . . . ) ∈ C.23 A lottery p ∈ ∆(C) resolves immediately and yields a consumption stream. We focus on the simple case with one-shot resolution of uncertainty
for expositional parsimony, but all of the following results generalize to richer settings that
incorporate temporal lotteries or true dynamic choice.24 In these more general dynamic
environments, simple atemporal lotteries over consumption streams provide sufficient
23

The product topology on C is compact and metrizable.
Kreps and Porteus (1978) provide the first complete analysis of dynamic choice with uncertainty
that resolves gradually through time (i.e., temporal lotteries). The models of temptation in Gul and
Pesendorfer (2004) and Noor (2011) use an infinite-horizon version of such a setting.
24
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choice observations to apply the following comparative statics. Note that our treatment
here is not fully dynamic, because the entire stream of consumption is settled immediately. This allows us to finesse the agent’s assessments of her future beliefs, her future
beliefs about even further future beliefs, and so on. Our point here is that sophistication and naivete can be distinguished without appeal to these higher-order epistemic
assessments.
Suppose the commitment preference is represented by an expected-utility function
whose values u(c) = u(δc ) over deterministic streams (that is, whose Bernoulli utility
indices) comply with exponential discounting,
u(c) =

∞
X

δ t−1 w(ct ),

(10)

t=1

for some instantaneous utility function w : [a, b] → R. The quasi-hyperbolic discounting model captures present bias with an additional discount factor applied to all future
periods: If the present-bias factor is β, then ex-post (period 1) choice from a menu of
consumption streams x will maximize
vβ (c) = w(c1 ) + β

∞
X

δ t−1 w(ct ).

(11)

t=2

In the deterministic quasi-hyperbolic discounting model, the individual’s ex-ante (period 0) behavior may reflect an incorrect belief that her future present-bias parameter is
β̂, while her ex-post behavior actually uses the present-bias parameter β. It is immediate that this choice procedure corresponds to a special case of the deterministic Strotz
representation.
Definition 6. A quasi-hyperbolic (QH) representation of (%, C) is a tuple (w, β, β̂, δ) of
a continuous and nontrivial function w : [a, b] → R and scalars β, β̂ ∈ [0, 1] and δ ∈ (0, 1),
such that (u, vβ , vβ̂ ) defined as in Equations (10) and (11) for these parameters is a Strotz
representation for (%, C).
Corollaries 1 and 2 illustrate the implications of our absolute and comparative definitions in the QH representation. These results follow immediately from Theorems 1 and
2, respectively, together with the observation that vβ̂ u vβ if and only if β̂ ≥ β.
Corollary 1. Suppose (%, C) has a QH representation (w, β, β̂, δ). Then the individual
is naive if and only if β̂ ≥ β (and is sophisticated if and only if β̂ = β).
Corollary 2. Suppose (%1 , C1 ) and (%2 , C2 ) are naive and have QH representations
(w, β1 , β̂1 , δ) and (w, β2 , β̂2 , δ). Then the following are equivalent:
22

1. Individual 1 is more naive than individual 2.
2. OV1 (x) ≥ OV2 (x) for all menus x.
3. β̂1 ≥ β̂2 ≥ β2 ≥ β1 , or β̂2 = β2 (individual 2 is sophisticated).
The parametric restriction for comparative naivete in Corollary 2 includes the special
cases where individuals share the same ex-post behavior and differ only in their beliefs
(i.e., β1 = β2 and β̂1 ≥ β̂2 ), and where they share the same ex-ante beliefs can differ only
in their actual behavior (i.e., β̂1 = β̂1 and β2 ≥ β1 ). However, these particular cases of
comparative naivete are sometimes too restrictive, in that they permit the comparison
fewer individuals. Our characterization of comparative naivete permits a more complete
ordering of individuals by allowing differences in both ex-ante beliefs and ex-post behavior, yet still rules out the counterintuitive predictions that could arise from other, more
permissive parametric comparisons. In particular, Corollary 2 implies that comparing
differences or ratios of parameters is not sensible for the quasi-hyperbolic discounting
model, as already suggested in Section 2.

4

General Results

In many environments, temptation is more realistically modeled as a random phenomenon.
For example, someone might be motivated to work out at the gym on some days but lack
enough willpower on other days. Uncertainty about future behavior is arguably even
more compelling when considering naivete about temptation: Even if her actual future
behavior is deterministic, a naive agent who cannot precisely predict her behavior might
more naturally be modeled as having uncertainty about her future temptation, rather
than making a resolute but incorrect prediction.
As is standard in ubiquitous applications, random choice data should be interpreted as
an idealization of repeated observations of choices from menus. We stress that the case of
random choice is a pure generalization of deterministic choice, since deterministic choice
is the special case where the distribution of choices is concentrated on a single object.
That is, random choice only increases the range of observable environments relative to
the deterministic case, and environments where only a single choice is observed still fall
under the purview of our model. That all said, we choose to study the general case
because the literature suggests compelling reasons to accommodate randomness, and
random temptation has been a part of many recent applications of time inconsistency
and naivete, ranging from optimal contracting (Eliaz and Spiegler (2006), Spiegler (2011))
to credit markets (Heidhues and Kőszegi (2010)) to the design of commitment devices
(Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson (2011)).
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In measuring naivete, as is the case for any model of mistaken beliefs, one important
and subtle consideration that arises when making repeated observations of choices from
menus is the potential for learning; the agent may learn about her tendency to be tempted
from her past choices and therefore become more sophisticated over time (e.g., Ali (2011)).
For example, if an agent initially exhibits a preference x  {p} but finds herself repeatedly
and frequently choosing an alternative q ∈ x that is ex-ante dominated by p, she may
revise her beliefs and consequently update her ranking of menus to {p}  x over the
course of an experiment. However, while we must observe repeated choices from menus
to elicit the entire distribution of random ex-post choice, our analysis of ex-ante choice
only concerns the initial beliefs held by the agent at the beginning of the experiment. As
such, we only need a single set of observations of her choices between menus to elicit her
initial deterministic menu preference. That is, for our purposes, it suffices to observe just
the initial ranking of x and {p} to determine the beliefs held prior to any learning. Any
effects of learning on menu preference after the initial ranking can be ignored as outside
the purview of our model.

4.1

Primitives

We again consider a pair of behavioral primitives. As before, the first primitive is a
preference relation % on K(∆(C)), which captures the agent’s demand for commitment
and hence her ex-ante beliefs about future temptations. However, the second primitive is
now a random choice rule λ : K(∆(C)) → ∆(∆(C)) such that λx (x) = 1, where ∆(∆(C))
denotes the space of lotteries over ∆(C). The behavior encoded in λ is taken while
experiencing temptation ex post. For each x ∈ K(∆(C)), λx is a probability measure
over lotteries, with λx ({p}) denoting the probability of choosing the lottery p ∈ x out of
this menu. More generally, λx (y) denotes the probability of choosing a lottery in the set
y ⊂ x when the choice set is the menu x.
A random choice rule λ is deterministic if λx is degenerate for all menus x, that is,
λx = δp for some p ∈ x. Identifying the Dirac measure δp with p itself, in this case we
can express λ as a standard choice function C : K(∆(C)) → ∆(C) by taking C(x) = p for
δp = λx . Thus the behavioral primitives in this section are a strict generalization of the
deterministic environment considered in Section 3.

4.2

Absolute Naivete

The conceptual apparatus just introduced for the deterministic case extends to random
choice. For any (compound) lottery λx ∈ ∆(∆(C)), its average choice m(λx ) is the
R
expectation of the identity function under λx or, formally, m(λx ) = p dλx ∈ ∆(C). That
is, m(λx ) reduces the compound lottery λx into a single lottery in ∆(C). For example,
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suppose lottery p gives outcome c with probability 1, and q gives c with probability 2/3
and c0 with probability 1/3, so p = δc and q = (2/3)δc + (1/3)δc0 . Suppose also that p is
chosen from the menu {p, q} with probability λ{p,q} ({p}) = 1/2. Then the unconditional
probability of outcome c given this menu is 5/6: m(λ{p,q} ) = (5/6)δc + (1/6)δc0 . This
reduction from a distribution over multiple lotteries to a single lottery does not assume
any attitude towards risk, such as risk neutrality, over deterministic outcomes in C.25
Definition 7. An individual is sophisticated if x ∼ {m(λx )} for all menus x. An
individual is naive if x % {m(λx )} for all menus x. An individual is strictly naive if she
is naive and not sophisticated.
A sophisticate is indifferent between selecting the choice set x for tomorrow and committing to the actual distribution of outcomes m(λx ) that would result from her choices
from that menu. A naif incorrectly anticipates making more virtuous choices and hence
expects a more attractive distribution of outcomes from x than will occur in actuality. As noted above, deterministic second-stage choice formalized as a choice function
C : K(∆(C)) → ∆(C) is a special case of the random choice framework. The corresponding random choice rule λ satisfies λx ({p}) = 1 if and only if C(x) = p, and hence
m(λx ) = C(x). In this case, the conditions for sophistication and naivete in Definition 7
reduce to our prior definitions, x ∼ {C(x)} and x % {C(x)}, respectively.
Our definitions lend themselves to simple tests of violations of sophistication and
naivete even when choices are random. Consider a binary menu {p, q} where {p}  {q},
and let α = λ{p,q} ({p}). Then, m(λ{p,q} ) = αp+(1−α)q and thus sophistication (naivete)
implies
{p, q} ∼ (%) {αp + (1 − α)q}.
In other words, a sophisticate is indifferent between the option set {p, q} and a mixture of
these lotteries that matches her ex-post choice frequencies, whereas a naif prefers keeping
her options open. One possible experimental design that implements our approach would
be to elicit the ranking of {p, q} and {α̂p + (1 − α̂)q} for various values of α̂ and then
compare these rankings to the actual choice frequencies α of a group of subjects.26
We now apply our general definitions to the random Strotz model, which generalizes
the classic Strotz model to allow uncertainty about future temptations. Dekel and Lipman (2012) provide a thorough analysis of the random Strotz model. Just as a single
temptation is parametrized using a single expected-utility function in the deterministic
Strotz model considered in Section 3, a random temptation is analogously parametrized
25

Our analysis does implicitly assume indifference to compounding. However, indifference to compounding can be relaxed by considering appropriate certainty equivalents for compound lotteries rather
than assuming indifference between λx and m(λx ).
26
This experimental design is implemented in Le Yaouanq (2015) to measure individual-level naivete
about memory lapses.
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using a probability measure over expected-utility functions. When defining the random
Strotz representation, it will be mathematically convenient to associate expected-utility
functions with their corresponding Bernoulli utility indices. Formally, let V denote the
set of all continuous functions v : C → R, and endow V with the supremum norm and
corresponding Borel σ-algebra. Thus, V is the set of all continuous Bernoulli utility indices on the consumption space C, and each element v ∈ V can also be identified (with
slight abuse of notation) with its corresponding expected-utility function on ∆(C) by
R
letting v(p) ≡ C v(c) dp. Note that V is a vector space.
Definition 8. A probability measure µ on V has finite-dimensional support if there
exists a finite set of expected-utility functions {v1 , . . . , vn } ⊂ V such that supp(µ) ⊂
span({v1 , . . . , vn }).
We will restrict attention to random Strotz representations with finite-dimensional
support. This is arguably a mild restriction, as we are unaware of any application of
the random Strotz model that does not have finite-dimensional support. For example,
any deterministic Strotz representation (see Section 3) or any random quasi-hyperbolic
discounting representation (see Section 4.4) has finite-dimensional support. In addition,
if the consumption space C is finite, then any probability measure µ on V trivially has
finite-dimensional support.
Without loss of generality, we also restrict attention to probability measures on V
that are nontrivial, in the sense of assigning probability zero to constant functions.27
Definition 9. A random Strotz representation of (%, λ) is a triple (u, µ, µ̂) of a nontrivial
expected-utility function u and nontrivial probability measures µ and µ̂ over V with finitedimensional support such that the function U : K(∆(C)) → R defined by
Z
U (x) =
max u(p) dµ̂(v)
V p∈Bv (x)

is a utility representation of % and, for all menus x and all measurable y ⊂ x,
λx (y) = µ(p−1
x (y))
for some measurable selection function px : V → x with px (v) ∈ Bu (Bv (x)) for all v ∈ V.
The interpretation of the representation of the ex-ante preference % is straightforward.
To understand the representation of the ex-post random choice rule λ, note that after the
realization of a temptation utility v ∈ V, the individual’s choice of lottery is an element
27

The restriction to nontrivial measures in the definition of the random Strotz representation is without
loss of generality since any weight assigned to constant functions can be moved to the commitment utility
u without altering the ex-ante preference or ex-post random choice rule.
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of the set Bu (Bv (x)) of lexicographic maximizers of v then u. There may be multiple
elements in this set for a fixed v, and the individual’s tie-breaking procedure among
these is modeled using a selection function px from the correspondence v 7→ Bu (Bv (x))
mapping temptations to possible choices.28 Given this mapping from temptation utilities
to choices, the distribution of temptation utilities then determines the stochastic choice
of the individual. The probability of choosing an element of the subset y ⊂ x is equal to
the probability under µ of an ex-post expected-utility function v for which the optimal
choice is in y, that is, λx (y) = µ({v ∈ V : px (v) ∈ y}).
The functional characterization of naivete for the random Strotz representation is the
stochastic generalization of the definition for deterministic Strotz. In the deterministic
case, naivete implies the believed v̂ is more u-aligned than v: v̂ u v. In the random
case, the believed distribution over all possible temptations stochastically dominates the
actual distribution of temptations, where stochastic dominance is with respect to the u
order. As is standard, a stochastically dominant measure puts more weight on the upper
contour sets of the basic ordering u over the state space. The following definitions
adapt the technology developed by Dekel and Lipman (2012).
Definition 10. Let u be an expected-utility function. A measurable set U ⊂ V is a
u-upper set if, for any v ∈ U and v 0 ∈ V, if v 0 u v then v 0 ∈ U.
We let u denote both the basic ordering over expected-utility functions and the
induced stochastic order over measures on expected-utility functions.
Definition 11. Let u be an expected-utility function, and let µ, µ̂ be probability measures
over V. Then µ̂ is more u-aligned than µ, written as µ̂ u µ, if µ̂(U) ≥ µ(U) for all
u-upper sets U.
Note that v̂ u v (in the determinate sense) is equivalent to δv̂ u δv (in the stochastic
sense). We write µ̂ ≈ µ whenever both µ̂ u µ and µ u µ̂, that is, when µ̂(U) =
µ(U) for all u-upper sets U. In this case, it can be shown that the measures induce
identical distributions over ex-post expected-utility preferences and can differ only by
affine transformations of the utility functions in their supports.29 They are therefore
identical in every respect that is relevant for both ex-ante and ex-post choice.
Generalizing our earlier result, absolute naivete is equivalent to µ̂ dominating µ in
the stochastic order generated by u .
28
Since there may be a multiplicity of selection functions, there may in turn be multiple maximizing
choice probabilities over x for a fixed probability measure µ over V. That is, just as there can be a
multiple choice functions induced by a choice correspondence, there can be multiple random choice rules
that maximize the same random Strotz representation. However, this multiplicity is not important for
our results since observing any maximizing random choice rule provides sufficient information for our
comparatives.
29
The formal statement and proof of this claim can be found in Dekel and Lipman (2012); in particular,
see their Theorem 3 and its proof.
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Theorem 3. Suppose (%, λ) has a random Strotz representation (u, µ, µ̂). Then the
individual is naive if and only if µ̂ u µ (and is sophisticated if and only if µ̂ ≈ µ).
The proof of this result makes use of a characterization by Dekel and Lipman (2012)
of comparative temptation aversion for ex-ante preferences with random Strotz representations. They say that %2 is more temptation averse than %1 if, for all menus x and
lotteries p,30
{p} 1 x =⇒ {p} 2 x.
Dekel and Lipman (2012) show that if %i has a random Strotz representation (u, µi )
for i = 1, 2, then %2 is more temptation averse than %1 if and only if µ1 u µ2 . To
prove Theorem 3, we apply this comparative to the measures µ̂ and µ in our two-period
random Strotz representation for a single individual. In particular, we show that naivete
is equivalent to the condition
Z
Z
x
max u(p) dµ(v), ∀x.
max u(p) dµ̂(v) = U (x) ≥ u(m(λ )) =
V p∈Bv (x)

V p∈Bv (x)

This condition implies that the hypothetical ex-ante preference %∗ generated by the
representation with correct beliefs (u, µ) is more temptation averse than the actual exante preference % with representation (u, µ̂), and hence µ̂ u µ.

4.3

Comparative Naivete

In this section, we adapt the comparatives introduced in the deterministic case to the
stochastic setting. Similar to our strategy for extending the absolute definition of naivete,
our basic approach to extending deterministic comparisons of naivete to the random case
is based on replacing the deterministic choice with the average choice.
4.3.1

Comparing Underdemand for Commitment

Definition 12 generalizes Definition 4 by detecting failures to choose beneficial commitment opportunities.
Definition 12. Individual 1 is more naive than individual 2 if, for all menus x and
lotteries p,
x 2 {p} 2 {m(λx2 )} =⇒ x 1 {p} 1 {m(λx1 )}.
30

This formal definition appears with different interpretations in Ahn (2008) and Sarver (2008). It
is also similar in spirit to the behavioral comparisons of ambiguity aversion in Epstein (1999) and
Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002), who compare arbitrary acts to unambiguous acts in the same manner
that we compare arbitrary menus to singleton menus.
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The parametric restrictions implied by Definition 12 in the random Strotz model generalize the result obtained in Theorem 2: Unless individual 2 is sophisticated, individual 1
is more naive if she is both more optimistic and less virtuous.
Theorem 4. Suppose (%1 , λ1 ) and (%2 , λ2 ) are naive and have random Strotz representations (u, µ1 , µ̂1 ) and (u, µ2 , µ̂2 ). Then individual 1 is more naive than individual 2 if
and only if
µ̂1 u µ̂2 u µ2 u µ1 ,
or µ̂2 ≈ µ2 (individual 2 is sophisticated).
4.3.2

Comparing Overvaluation

We now turn to generalizing the quantification of naivete with overvaluation introduced
in the deterministic case. The following generalization of Definition 5 introduces the
coefficient of overvaluation in the random setting.
Definition 13. Suppose (%, λ) has a random Strotz representation (u, µ, µ̂). The coefficient of overvaluation of a menu x is defined by:
Z
Z
max u(p) dµ̂(v) −
OV (x) =
max u(p) dµ(v) .
V p∈Bv (x)
V p∈Bv (x)
|
{z
} |
{z
}
believed indirect utility

actual indirect utility

A natural conjecture given Theorem 2 in the deterministic case is that comparing
naivete through underdemand for commitment is equivalent to comparing overvaluations.
This is generally false outside the deterministic case: Our behavioral comparative is
sufficient but not necessary. With random temptation, an individual can have larger
overvaluations than another but fail to have greater underdemand for commitment. The
most direct way to see this is to observe that if individual 2 is strictly naive and is less
naive than individual 1, then for every menu x,31
Z
Z
max u(p) dµ̂2 (v)
max u(p) dµ̂1 (v) ≥
V p∈Bv (x)
V p∈Bv (x)
{z
} |
{z
}
|
1’s believed indirect utility
2’s believed indirect utility
Z
Z
(12)
≥
max u(p) dµ2 (v) ≥
max u(p) dµ1 (v) .
p∈Bv (x)
p∈Bv (x)
|V
{z
} |V
{z
}
2’s actual indirect utility
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1’s actual indirect utility

By Theorem 4, if individual 2 is strictly naive and is less naive than individual 1, then µ̂1 u µ̂2 u
µ2 u µ1 . By the Dekel and Lipman (2012) characterization of temptation aversion (see Theorem 7),
this condition is equivalent to Equation (12).
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The inequalities in Equation (12) exclude some cases where individual 1 is more
susceptible to exploitation than individual 2. For example, consider a binary choice
set {p, q} where p is ex-ante desirable, but q is tempting. Suppose that individual 1
anticipates that she chooses p from {p, q} with probability 90%, while she actually always
selects q. Suppose that individual 2 anticipates that she chooses p with probability 91%,
but her actual probability equals 89%. Individual 1 is not more naive than individual 2
according to Definition 12 because she is not more optimistic ex ante (µ̂1 6u µ̂2 ), but
the overvaluation of the menu {p, q} is nonetheless higher for 1 than for 2: OV1 ({p, q}) =
0.9(u(p) − u(q)) > OV2 ({p, q}) = 0.02(u(p) − u(q)).
This example shows that the behavioral comparison of naivete based on greater underdemand for commitment is no longer equivalent to the functional comparison of higher
overvaluations once we move beyond the deterministic setting of Section 3. Thus, we will
instead develop an alternative behavioral foundation for comparing overvaluations that
is valid in both the deterministic and the random choice settings.
Our general model incorporates all relevant dimensions of consumption into the space
C. But for the sake of developing intuition for how to calibrate overvaluation from choice
data, consider a special quasilinear environment where ex-ante choices are over pairs of
a menu x ∈ K(∆(C)) and a money transfer t ∈ R, and ex-ante utility takes the form
V (x, t) = U (x) + t. By definition, the overvaluation of the menu x must satisfy
(x, 0) ∼ (m(λx ), OV (x)).
The required monetary premium for x relative to m(λx ) immediately quantifies overvaluation for quasilinear preferences. Moreover, OV1 (x) ≥ OV2 (x) is equivalent to the
behavioral comparative that individual 1 is willing to overpay more for any menu x than
individual 2:
(x, 0) %2 (m(λx2 ), t) =⇒ (x, 0) %1 (m(λx1 ), t).
Since our general model does not assume quasilinearity, we must take a different
approach to calibrating overvaluation. As a side benefit of assuming expected utility, we
can use linearity in probabilities in a similar manner to the role of the money numeraire
in the previous discussion. That is, we can use additional odds of winning a good prize
to quantify the value of x relative to m(λx ). The following definition takes this approach
to converting overvaluation into a behavioral measure.
Definition 14. Fix any lotteries p, q such that {q}  {p}. The probability premium of
a menu x is defined by:

P (x; p, q) = sup α ∈ [0, 1] : (1 − α)x + α{p} % (1 − α){m(λx )} + α{q} .
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The probability premium indicates how much a menu x can be mixed with an inferior
alternative with the individual still preferring it to m(λx ) mixed with a superior alternative. To see its implications, suppose that % admits an affine utility representation.
Then, note that P (x; p, q) = 0 if and only if x ∼ {m(λx )}. In particular, the individual is
sophisticated if and only if P (x; p, q) = 0 for all x. If instead x  {m(λx )}, then mixing
these menus with the lotteries p and q, respectively, where {q}  {p}, could reverse this
preference. The weighting α needed for an individual to choose the commitment lottery
(1 − α){m(λx )} + α{q} over (1 − α)x + α{p} thus provides a quantitative measure of the
difference in the values assigned by the individual to x and m(λx ).
While more permissive than comparing underdemand for commitment, comparing
overvaluations still yields several useful equivalent characterizations for random Strotz
preferences. First, having greater overvaluations is equivalent to having greater probability premiums. Second, there is an additional interesting parametric restriction that
exposes itself in the random case. In particular, if an individual has larger overvaluations
than another, then the difference between her anticipated and actual distributions over
the realization of temptation will first-order stochastically dominate that difference for
the other individual.
Theorem 5. Suppose (%1 , λ1 ) and (%2 , λ2 ) are naive and have random Strotz representations (u, µ1 , µ̂1 ) and (u, µ2 , µ̂2 ). Fixing any lotteries p, q with {q} i {p}, the following
are equivalent:
1. P1 (x; p, q) ≥ P2 (x; p, q) for all menus x.
2. OV1 (x) ≥ OV2 (x) for all menus x.
3. µ̂1 (U) − µ1 (U) ≥ µ̂2 (U) − µ2 (U) for all u-upper sets U; equivalently, µ̂1 − µ1 u
µ̂2 − µ2 .
The parametric restriction on distributions in the last condition of Theorem 5 is
strictly weaker than the ordering of distributions that characterized underdemand for
commitment in Theorem 4. We therefore have as a corollary that comparing naivete
through underdemand for commitment is always a more selective criterion than comparing overvaluations. Recall, however, that in the deterministic case, the two restrictions
become equivalent (see Theorem 2) because then all the distributions are degenerate and
their differences can only take the values 0 or 1.
Corollary 3. Suppose (%1 , λ1 ) and (%2 , λ2 ) are naive and have random Strotz representations (u, µ1 , µ̂1 ) and (u, µ2 , µ̂2 ). If individual 1 is more naive than individual 2, then
OV1 (x) ≥ OV2 (x) for all menus x.
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4.4

Application to Random Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting

The standard quasi-hyperbolic discounting model assumes completely confident beliefs
about future behavior, an assumption that seems less palatable under naivete when these
beliefs are incorrect. We explore a generalization of the QH representation that allows for
naive and uncertain beliefs about β. Several applications in different areas employ naive
uncertainty about future present bias. Heidhues and Kőszegi (2010, Section 4) employ
random quasi-hyperbolic discounting to explain the structure of credit markets and its
consequent welfare implications. In their study of fertilizer adoption decisions by Kenyan
farmers, Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson (2011) estimate a specification of random quasihyperbolic discounting where naivete is parameterized by a mistakenly believed positive
chance of virtuous exponential discounting. Admitting uncertainty about intertemporal
substitution also often usefully serves as a reduced-form proxy for a shock in the economy,
like wage uncertainty, or for heterogeneity across agents in an aggregate economy, like
the distribution of wealth. Similarly, random present-bias can provide a parsimonious
channel for capturing uncertainty about external factors that affect present-bias.
In this subsection we establish the implications of our general results for the special
case of the random quasi-hyperbolic discounting representation. Definition 15 generalizes
Definition 6 by allowing the agent to be uncertain about the future value of her discount
factor β.
Definition 15. A random quasi-hyperbolic (RQH) representation of (%, λ) is a quadruple (w, F, F̂ , δ) of a continuous and nontrivial function w : [a, b] → R, a scalar δ ∈ (0, 1),
and cumulative distribution functions F and F̂ on [0, 1] such that when u and vβ are
defined as in Equations (10) and (11), the function U : K(∆(C)) → R defined by
Z
U (x) =

1

max u(p) dF̂ (β)
0 p∈Bvβ (x)

is a utility representation of % and, for all menus x and all measurable y ⊂ x,
λx (y) = F (p−1
x (y))
for some measurable selection function px : [0, 1] → x with px (β) ∈ Bu (Bvβ (x)) for all
β ∈ [0, 1].32
The following corollaries show how our definitions of absolute and comparative naivete
translate into stochastic generalizations of Corollaries 1 and 2 for the RQH representation.
32

We are abusing notation slightly and using F to also denote the probability measure on [0, 1] that
has F as its distribution function. That is, for any measurable set A ⊂ [0, 1], we write F (A) to denote
R
R1
dF (β). Hence λx (y) = 0 1[px (β)∈y] dF (β).
A
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A naive individual underestimates the degree of her present bias, which is reflected
in her belief F̂ putting more likelihood on larger values of β than the actual distribution
F that governs her ex-post choices. Let ≥F OSD denote the usual first-order stochastic
dominance order, with F̂ ≥F OSD F if F̂ (β) ≤ F (β) for all β ∈ [0, 1].
Corollary 4. Suppose (%, λ) has a RQH representation (w, F, F̂ , δ). Then the individual
is naive if and only if F̂ ≥F OSD F (and is sophisticated if and only if F̂ = F ).
As in the case of the general random Strotz representation, comparing naivete via
overvaluations is weaker than comparing underdemand for commitment. The following
corollary characterizes the implications of each.
Corollary 5. Suppose (%1 , λ1 ) and (%2 , λ2 ) are naive and have RQH representations
(w, F1 , F̂1 , δ) and (w, F2 , F̂2 , δ).
1. Individual 1 is more naive than individual 2 if and only if
F̂1 ≥F OSD F̂2 ≥F OSD F2 ≥F OSD F1 ,
or F̂2 = F2 (individual 2 is sophisticated).
2. Individual 1 has greater probability premiums than individual 2 if and only if individual 1 has greater overvaluations than individual 2 if and only if
F1 (β) − F̂1 (β) ≥ F2 (β) − F̂2 (β),

∀β ∈ [0, 1].

The RQH representation is a member of a more general subclass of the random Strotz
representation where the possible temptations are ordered by a one-dimensional parameter. We analyze this subclass, called the uncertain intensity Strotz representation, in
Appendix B. Corollaries 4 and 5 follow directly from the results in that section.

5
5.1

Extensions and Robustness
Costly Self-Control

So far we have not considered the possibility of an agent’s costly effort to resist temptations. We now turn to analyzing the robustness of our results in the presence of such
costly self-control. In particular, following Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), the individual’s
self-control cost of choosing alternative p from the menu x is maxq∈x v(q) − v(p), the
difference between the temptation utility of the most tempting option and that of p. The
33

individual maximizes her commitment utility u subject to these self-control costs, and
therefore chooses the option that maximizes the compromise u(p) + v(p) of commitment
utility and temptation utility. The following definition permits uncertainty about the
temptation utility, as in Stovall (2010), as well as possibility of incorrect beliefs about
the distribution of temptation utilities.
Definition 16. A random Gul-Pesendorfer representation of (%, λ) is a triple (u, µ, µ̂) of
a nontrivial expected-utility function u and nontrivial probability measures µ and µ̂ over
V with finite-dimensional support such that the function U : K(∆(C)) → R defined by
Z h
i
U (x) =
max(u(p) + v(p)) − max v(q) dµ̂(v)
V

p∈x

q∈x

is a utility representation of % and, for all menus x and all measurable y ⊂ x,
λx (y) = µ(p−1
x (y))
for some measurable selection function px : V → x with px (v) ∈ Bu+v (x) for all v ∈ V .
Dekel and Lipman (2012) show that under a mild continuity assumption, the menu
preference alone cannot distinguish the random Gul-Pesendorfer model and the random
Strotz model. However, they also find that a random Gul-Pesendorfer representation of
% implies different ex-post choice probabilities than those implied by a random Strotz
representation of %. Analyzing whether our results can be extended to deal with selfcontrol preferences is therefore important since the identification of naivete proposed in
Sections 3 and 4 relies on a particular model of ex-ante behavior.33
The following theorem states that if the individual is naive and admits a random
Gul-Pesendorfer representation, then the ex-ante beliefs derived from the representation
are optimistic. More precisely, naivete implies that any random Gul-Pesendorfer representation predicts ex-post choices that are more virtuous than the actual ones. The
intuition is the following: Self-control costs increase the attractiveness of commitment
since tempting options can be undesirable ex ante even if they are not chosen ex post.
Thus the definition of absolute naivete proposed in Section 4 serves as a conservative and
robust test to reveal an individual’s optimism even in the presence of costly self-control.
Theorem 6. Suppose that (%, λ) has a random Gul-Pesendorfer representation (u, µ, µ̂),
and that the individual is naive. Then, for any u-upper set U,
µ̂({v ∈ V : u + v ∈ U}) ≥ µ({v ∈ V : u + v ∈ U}).
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(13)

Dekel and Lipman (2012) show that both representations can be distinguished with the additional
observation of ex-post choices if we require the agent’s beliefs to be correct under these representations. Otherwise, the models are indistinguishable because of possible disagreement between actual and
perceived distributions.
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In addition, if the individual is strictly naive, Equation (13) is satisfied with strict inequality for some U.
It is important to note that the converse of Theorem 6 fails. In particular, even if
µ̂ = µ and the individual has correct beliefs about her future behavior, the desire to
avoid self-control costs may result in {m(λx )}  x for some menus, in violation of both
our behavioral definitions of naivete and sophistication. Thus our behavioral definition
of naivete is sufficient but not necessary for overoptimistic beliefs when individuals have
self-control preferences.
In a companion paper Ahn, Iijima, and Sarver (2016), we explore alternative behavioral conditions that tightly characterize naivete for deterministic self-control preferences.
We also show that there is an impossibility result when randomness is permitted: It is
impossible to construct a behavioral definition that tightly characterizes naivete for the
random Gul-Pesendorfer representation. This impossibility is closely related to the lack
of tight identification in this model—the random Gul-Pesendorfer representation of exante choice is not unique. That is, there are multiple different measures µ̂ that can be
used to represent the same ex-ante menu preference, but these different measures do
generate different ex-post random choices. Therefore, depending on which measure is
used to represent ex-ante beliefs, the same combination of ex-ante and ex-post behavior
could potentially be classified as naive (i.e., overly optimistic), sophisticated, or overly
pessimistic. In light of this impossibility of a tight characterization, Theorem 6 is perhaps
the best result that one can hope to obtain in the presence of random self-control costs.

5.2

Uncertainty in Normative Preferences

The random Strotz interpretation of commitment preferences relies on the assumption
that normative preferences are certain ex ante. The elicitation of naivete provided in
Section 4 is therefore suited to situations where long-term preferences are known and
where deviations are always undesirable (e.g., temptations, addictions, memory lapses).
In some situations, however, the individual might expect future shocks to her normative
preferences. In that case, her menu choices trade off commitment versus flexibility and
the condition x  {m(λx )} does not necessarily indicate unrealistic expectations: An
individual who anticipates receiving some information about her normative ranking prior
to selecting an option might rationally refuse to commit to her average choice.
Identifying the flexibility-loving part from the commitment-loving component of preferences in order to detect naive anticipations requires additional assumptions. For example, in some contexts, the normative states are tied to objective contingencies that
can be directly observed by the analyst (e.g., financial events, weather, health status).
In this case, the identification of naivete can be performed essentially as described in
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Section 4 conditional on each normative state, assuming the choice between menus can
be conditioned on the realization of the state. Extensions of our analysis might also be
possible without objective states. For instance, Stovall (2018) considers a model where
both the normative uncertainty (over u) and the temptation uncertainty (over v) are
resolved in an interim period prior to the direct experience of temptation. We conjecture
that our approach could be adapted to any model such as this where uncertainty about
the normative preference is resolved before temptation occurs.
Even in cases where these workarounds are not possible and our techniques are not
immediately applicable, the sophistication hypothesis nonetheless imposes some necessary
properties on choice data. In particular, options can be relevant ex ante only if they
are chosen with some probability ex post, an axiom that Ahn and Sarver (2013) call
consequentialism: x ∼ supp(λx ) for all menus x is a necessary condition for the existence
of a sophisticated representation. In contrast, the condition x  supp(λx ) indicates that
the individual incorrectly estimates the virtue of her choices inside x.
As an illustration, suppose that an individual is considering buying a membership
that gives her free access to the gym. Let x denote the option set that includes any
number of gym visits, and let p ∈ x denote zero visits. Observing that she values the
membership ex ante (x  {p}) but that she attends the gym with probability zero ex post
(λx ({p}) = 1) is sufficient to conclude that she had unrealistic expectations regarding
her gym attendance.34 Relatedly, suppose that the individual can self-impose a penalty
for smoking. Her initial choice set is {p1 , p2 } (smoking or not) but she can replace p1 by
a contract p3 according to which smoking results in the payment of a penalty. Observing
that she selects the contract ({p3 , p2 }  {p1 , p2 }) but continues smoking with probability
3 2
one despite the penalty (λ{p ,p } ({p3 }) = 1) is sufficient to conclude that her menu choice
was led by naive anticipations.35

34

Note that all of the options in x are in fact pairs consisting of a number of visits together with the
expense of the gym membership. Letting q denote zero visits without the paying for the membership,
the choice to join the gym corresponds to the preference x  {q}. Since {q}  {p} by dominance (the
individual prefers not to pay the cost of the membership without going), we have x  {p} = supp(λx ).
35
This argument implicitly assumes that the individual weakly prefers having the option to quit to
being forced to smoke ({p1 , p2 } % {p1 }) and that the individual prefers not to pay the penalty all else
3 2
equal ({p1 }  {p3 }). Thus {p3 , p2 }  {p1 , p2 } % {p1 }  {p3 } = supp(λ{p ,p } ).
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A

A Comparative from Dekel and Lipman (2012)

In this section, we summarize a relevant result from Dekel and Lipman (2012) that will play
a central role in our proofs of Theorems 3, 4, and 5. Recall the definition of comparative
temptation aversion: Individual 2 is more temptation averse than individual 1 if, for all menus
x and lotteries p,
{p} 1 x =⇒ {p} 2 x.
Theorem 7 (Dekel and Lipman (2012)). Suppose %1 and %2 have random Strotz representations (u, µ1 ) and (u, µ2 ). Then %2 is more temptation averse than %1 if and only if µ1 u µ2 .
Dekel and Lipman (2012) consider only a finite prize space C in their paper. In the Supplemental Appendix, we prove that their result can be extended to any compact metric space C
and any random Strotz representation (with finite-dimensional support) defined on that space.36
This extension to compact spaces is not merely a technical exercise, as it is critical for many of
the applications of our results, such as dynamic consumption problems where C = [a, b]N .

B

Uncertain Intensity Random Strotz

In this section, we highlight a useful special case of the random Strotz representation where the
uncertainty over future behavior is only over the magnitude of the future temptation, and not in
its basic direction. For example, the individual may know that she will crave sweet snacks (but
not salty snacks) ex post, but is uncertain of how strong her craving for sweets will be. This
uncertain intensity Strotz representation encompasses the random quasi-hyperbolic discounting
model studied in Section 4.4 where the individual is uncertain of the intensity of her present
bias, and the corollaries presented below provide a bridge between our main theorems and the
results in that section.
Two expected-utility functions u and v are independent if they are nontrivial and it is not
the case that v ≈ u or v ≈ −u.
Definition 17. An uncertain intensity Strotz representation of (%, λ) is a quadruple (u, v, F, F̂ )
of two independent expected-utility functions u, v and two cumulative distribution functions F, F̂
on [0, 1] such that the function U : K(∆(C)) → R defined by
Z
U (x) =

1

max

u(p) dF̂ (α)

0 p∈Bαu+(1−α)v (x)
36
Although Definition 9 and Theorem 7 impose the restriction that the measure µ in the random Strotz
representation must have finite-dimensional support, our proof in the Supplemental Appendix shows
that the “if” direction in Theorem 7 is true even without the finite-dimensional support assumption. It
remains an open question whether the “only if” direction can be extended to probably measures with
arbitrary support. However, we view the exploration of additional generalizations of this results as a
purely technical question. As we discussed in Section 4, we are not aware of any application of the
random Strotz model that does not have finite-dimensional support.
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is a utility representation of % and, for all menus x and all measurable y ⊂ x,
λx (y) = F (p−1
x (y))
for some measurable selection function px : [0, 1] → x with px (α) ∈ Bu (Bαu+(1−α)v (x)) for all
α ∈ [0, 1].
For the case of an uncertain intensity Strotz representation, the direction of the temptation
is known to be v, but the magnitude of that temptation relative to the virtuous utility u is
uncertain. A naive individual underestimates the influence of v, and this bias is reflected in
her belief F̂ over the intensities in [0, 1] putting more likelihood on larger weighting of u (hence
lower weighting of v) than F .
Corollary 6. Suppose (%, λ) has a uncertain intensity Strotz representation (u, v, F, F̂ ). Then
the individual is naive if and only if F̂ ≥F OSD F (and is sophisticated if and only if F̂ = F ).
Corollary 7. Suppose (%1 , λ1 ) and (%2 , λ2 ) are naive and have uncertain intensity Strotz
representations (u, v, F1 , F̂1 ) and (u, v, F2 , F̂2 ).
1. Individual 1 is more naive than individual 2 if and only if
F̂1 ≥F OSD F̂2 ≥F OSD F2 ≥F OSD F1 ,
or F̂2 = F2 (individual 2 is sophisticated).
2. Individual 1 has greater probability premiums than individual 2 if and only if individual
1 has greater overvaluations than individual 2 if and only if
F1 (α) − F̂1 (α) ≥ F2 (α) − F̂2 (α),

C
C.1

∀α ∈ [0, 1].

Proofs
Proof of Theorem 3

Suppose the random choice rule λ has a random Strotz representation (u, µ). Consider the
hypothetical sophisticated ex-ante preference %∗ that is also be represented by (u, µ). The
following lemma shows how this hypothetical preference can be determined from λ and u.
Lemma 1. Suppose λ has a random Strotz representation (u, µ). Then for any menu x,
Z
x
u(m(λ )) =
max u(p) dµ(v).
V p∈Bv (x)

In particular, if we define a binary relation %∗ on K(∆(C)) by
x %∗ y ⇐⇒ u(m(λx )) ≥ u(m(λy )),
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then (u, µ) is a random Strotz representation for %∗ .
Proof. If (u, µ) represents λ then by definition there exists, for all menus x, a measurable
selection function px : V → x with px (v) ∈ Bu (Bv (x)) such that
λx (y) = µ(p−1
x (y))
for all measurable y ⊂ x. Thus λx is the distribution on x induced by the random variable
px defined on the measure space (V, µ). Therefore, the standard change of variables formula
together with the linearity and continuity of u imply
Z
Z
max u(p) dµ(v) =
u(px (v)) dµ(v)
V p∈Bv (x)
V
Z

Z
x
x
= u(p) dλ (p) = u
p dλ (p) = u(m(λx )),
x

x

as desired.



Turning now to the proof of Theorem 3, fix a random Strotz representation (u, µ, µ̂) for
(%, λ), and define %∗ as in Lemma 1. To establish sufficiency, suppose the individual is naive.
Then for all menus x and lotteries p,
{p}  x =⇒ {p}  {m(λx )}
(naivete)

=⇒ u m λ{p} = u(p) > u(m(λx ))
=⇒ {p} ∗ x.
Thus %∗ is more temptation averse than %. Since (u, µ) represents %∗ by Lemma 1, Theorem 7
implies that µ̂ u µ. If the individual is sophisticated, then a similar argument shows that the
converse also holds: % is also more temptation averse than %∗ (in particular, %=%∗ ) and hence
µ u µ̂ also holds, i.e., µ̂ ≈ µ.
To establish necessity, suppose µ̂ u µ. By Theorem 7, %∗ is more temptation averse than
%. By contrapositive, this is equivalent to the condition
x %∗ {p} =⇒ x % {p}.
Note that for any menu x, if we take p = m(λx ) then
u(m(λx )) = u(p) = u m λ{p}



and hence x ∼∗ {p} = {m(λx )}. Since %∗ is more temptation averse than %, this implies
x % {m(λx )}. Thus the individual is naive. If we also have µ u µ̂ then another application
of Theorem 7 implies the condition above can be strengthened to x %∗ {p} ⇐⇒ x % {p}. In
this case, x ∼∗ {m(λx )} implies x ∼ {m(λx )} and hence the individual is sophisticated.

39

C.2

Proof of Theorem 4

Our proof of this theorem is based on two lemmas. This first lemma shows that once we exclude
the case where individual 2 is sophisticated, our condition for more naive in Definition 12 is
equivalent to the analogous condition but with weak preferences rather than strict.
Lemma 2. Suppose (%1 , λ1 ) and (%2 , λ2 ) are naive and have random Strotz representations
(u, µ1 , µ̂1 ) and (u, µ2 , µ̂2 ). Then individual 1 is more naive than individual 2 if and only if either
x %2 {p} %2 {m(λx2 )} =⇒ x %1 {p} %1 {m(λx1 )},

(14)

or individual 2 is sophisticated.
Proof. The “if” direction is straightforward and is therefore omitted. To prove the “only if”
direction, suppose individual 1 is more naive than individual 2. We will show that if individual 2
is strictly naive (i.e., naive but not sophisticated), then Equation (14) must hold. First, note
that since (%i , λi ) has a random Strotz representation (u, µi , µ̂i ), we have that for any menus x
and y and any α ∈ [0, 1],
αx+(1−α)y

u(m(λi

)) = αu(m(λxi )) + (1 − α)u(m(λyi )).

(15)

This assertion is easy to verify by appealing to Lemma 1 together with the linearity of the
random Strotz value function for menus. Second, under the assumption that individual 2 is
strictly naive, there exists some menu y such that y 2 {m(λy2 )}. Fix any lottery q such that
y 2 {q} 2 {m(λy2 )}. Then, for any menu x and lottery p,
x %2 {p} %2 {m(λx2 )}
αx+(1−α)y

=⇒ αx + (1 − α)y 2 {αp + (1 − α)q} 2 {m(λ2
=⇒ αx + (1 − α)y 1 {αp + (1 − α)q}
=⇒ x %1 {p}

)},

∀α ∈ (0, 1)

αx+(1−α)y
1 {m(λ1
)},

∀α ∈ (0, 1)

%1 {m(λx1 )}.

The first implication follows from the linearity of the random Strotz value function for menus
together with Equation (15). The second implication follows because individual 1 is more naive
than individual 2. The final implication follows by taking the limit as α → 1, given that the
random Strotz representation is continuous in the mixture operation. Thus we have shown that
Equation (14) holds.

The following lemma decomposes the condition in Lemma 2 into two more basic conditions.
The comparative of being more temptation averse is defined in the main text. The comparative
of being more virtuous is defined for the first time in this lemma. Intuitively, individual 2 is
more virtuous than individual 1 if she makes “better” choices (as measured by her commitment
preference) from every menu than individual 1.
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Lemma 3. Suppose (%1 , λ1 ) and (%2 , λ2 ) are naive, and suppose %1 and %2 share the same
commitment preference, i.e., {p} %1 {q} ⇐⇒ {p} %2 {q} for all lotteries p, q ∈ ∆(C). Then
Equation (14) is satisfied if and only if both of the following hold:
1. Individual 2 is more temptation averse than individual 1: {p} 1 x =⇒ {p} 2 x.
2. Individual 2 is more virtuous than individual 1: {p} 2 {m(λx2 )} =⇒ {p} 1 {m(λx1 )}.
Proof. Equation (14) implies condition (1): Fix any menu x and lottery p such that {p} 1
x. By Equation (14), we cannot have x %2 {p} %2 {m(λx2 )}. Thus either {p} 2 x or
{m(λx2 )} 2 {p}. To rule out the second possibility, note that since individual 2 is naive,
we must have x %2 {m(λx2 )}. By Equation (14), this implies x %1 {m(λx2 )} %1 {m(λx1 )}.
Therefore, {p} 1 {m(λx2 )}, and hence {p} 2 {m(λx2 )} since individuals 1 and 2 have the same
commitment preference. Thus the only possibility is {p} 2 x, as desired.
Equation (14) implies condition (2): Fix any menu x and lottery p such that {p} 2
{m(λx2 )}. Since individual 2 in naive, x %2 {m(λx2 )}. By Equation (14), this implies x %1
{m(λx2 )} %1 {m(λx1 )}. Individuals 1 and 2 share the same commitment preference, and therefore
{p} 1 {m(λx2 )} %1 {m(λx1 )}, as desired.
Conditions (1) and (2) together imply Equation (14): If individual 2 is more virtuous
than individual 1, then we must have {m(λx2 )} %2 {m(λx1 )}. Otherwise, taking p = m(λx1 ) in
condition (2) would lead to a contradiction. Therefore, since the individuals share the same
commitment preference, {p} %2 {m(λx2 )} =⇒ {p} %1 {m(λx1 )} for any lottery p. Combining
this with the contrapositive of condition (1), it follows directly that Equation (14) holds.

We are now ready to prove Theorem 4. If individual 2 is sophisticated, then the asserted
equivalence holds trivially. Therefore, suppose that individual 2 is strictly naive. By Theorem 3,
µ̂2 u µ2 . Also, since individual 2 is strictly naive, Lemmas 2 and 3 imply that individual 1 is
more naive than individual 2 if and only if 2 is both more temptation averse and more virtuous
than 1. By Theorem 7, individual 2 is more temptation averse than individual 1 if and only if
µ̂1 u µ̂2 . The proof is therefore completed if we can show that individual 2 is more virtuous
than individual 1 if and only if µ2 u µ1 . To see that this is true, define %∗1 and %∗2 as in
Lemma 1 for λ1 and λ2 , respectively. Then (u, µ1 ) and (u, µ2 ) represent %∗1 and %∗2 . Note that
for all menus x and lotteries p,
{p} i {m(λxi )} ⇐⇒ u(p) > u(m(λxi )) ⇐⇒ {p} ∗i x,

i = 1, 2.

Therefore, individual 2 is more virtuous than individual 1 if and only if %∗1 is more temptation
averse than %∗2 . By Theorem 7, this is true if and only if µ2 u µ1 .

C.3

Proof of Theorem 5

(1) ⇔ (2): Let Ui denote the value function from the representation (u, µ̂i ) for the ex-ante
preference %i for i = 1, 2. Also, recall from Lemma 1 that if λi has random Strotz representation
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(u, µi ), then
u(m(λxi )) =

Z
max u(p) dµi (v).

V p∈Bv (x)

Thus OVi (x) = Ui (x) − u(m(λxi )). Now, fix any lotteries p, q with {q} i {p} for i = 1, 2. For
each menu x, define

Axi ≡ α ∈ [0, 1] : (1 − α)x + α{p} %i (1 − α){m(λxi )} + α{q}

= α ∈ [0, 1] : (1 − α)Ui (x) + αu(p) ≥ (1 − α)u(m(λxi )) + αu(q)

= α ∈ [0, 1] : (1 − α)OVi (x) ≥ α(u(q) − u(p)) .
By definition, Pi (x; p, q) = sup Axi . Note that Axi is a closed interval. Moreover, since both
individuals are naive, we have x %i m(λxi ) and therefore 0 ∈ Axi . Also, 1 ∈
/ Axi since {q} i {p}.
This implies
α = Pi (x; p, q) ⇐⇒ (1 − α)OVi (x) = α(u(q) − u(p)).
Therefore, OV1 (x) ≥ OV2 (x) if and only if P1 (x; p, q) ≥ P2 (x; p, q).
(2) ⇔ (3): For any menu x,
OV1 (x) ≥ OV2 (x)
Z
Z
⇐⇒
max u(p) dµ̂1 (v) −
max u(p) dµ1 (v)
V p∈Bv (x)
V p∈Bv (x)
Z
Z
≥
max u(p) dµ̂2 (v) −
max u(p) dµ2 (v)
V p∈Bv (x)
V p∈Bv (x)
Z
Z
1
1
1 
1 
max u(p) d µ̂2 + µ1 (v).
⇐⇒
max u(p) d µ̂1 + µ2 (v) ≥
2
2
2
2
V p∈Bv (x)
V p∈Bv (x)
If this is true of all menus x, then the (hypothetical) preference represented by the random
Strotz representation (u, 21 µ̂2 + 12 µ1 ) is more temptation averse than the preference represented
by (u, 21 µ̂1 + 21 µ2 ). Thus by Theorem 7, OV1 (x) ≥ OV2 (x) for all x if and only if 21 µ̂1 + 12 µ2 u
1
1
2 µ̂2 + 2 µ1 or, equivalently,
1
1
1
1
µ̂1 (U) + µ2 (U) ≥ µ̂2 (U) + µ1 (U)
2
2
2
2
for every u-upper set U. Rearranging terms, this is precisely condition (3).

C.4

Proof of Theorem 6

Define the function σ : V → V by σ(v) = u + v, and define the measures ν̂ and ν on V by
ν̂(E) = µ̂(σ −1 (E)) and ν(E) = µ(σ −1 (E)) for any measurable set E. Observe that for any
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menu x,
Z

Z

min

min u(p)dν̂(v) =

u(p)dµ̂(v)

(change of variables)

V p∈Bu+v (x)

V p∈Bv (x)

≥

Z h

i
max(u(p) + v(p)) − max v(q) dµ̂(v)

V

p∈x

q∈x

= U (x)
≥ u(m(λx ))
(naivete)
Z
u(px (v))dµ(v)
=
ZV
min u(p)dµ(v)
≥
V p∈Bu+v (x)
Z
min u(p)dν(v).
(change of variables)
=

(16)

V p∈Bv (x)

Thus,
Z

Z
min u(p)dν̂(v) ≥

V p∈Bv (x)

min u(p)dν(v),
V p∈Bv (x)

which we rewrite as
Z

Z
max [−u(p)]dν̂(v) ≤

V p∈Bv (x)

max [−u(p)]dν(v).

(17)

V p∈Bv (x)

Consider the binary relations %ν̂ and %ν defined by their Random Strotz representations
(−u, ν̂) and (−u, ν), respectively. Equation (17) shows that %ν̂ is more temptation-averse
than %ν . Theorem 7 applies since ν̂ and ν have finite-dimensional supports, and implies that
ν −u ν̂.
Consider a u-upper set U, and v ∈ V \ U, v 0 ∈ V such that v 0 −u v. It is easy to show that
this latter condition is equivalent to v u v 0 . Suppose that v 0 ∈ U. Since U is a u-upper set,
the condition v u v 0 implies v ∈ U, which is a contradiction. Hence, v 0 ∈ V \ U for any v 0 such
that v 0 −u v. This shows that V \ U is a (−u)-upper set, and therefore ν(V \ U) ≥ ν̂(V \ U),
or equivalently ν̂(U) ≥ ν(U).
We therefore have
µ̂({v ∈ V : u + v ∈ U}) = ν̂(U) ≥ ν(U) = µ({v ∈ V : u + v ∈ U}).

(18)

To complete the proof, we show that Equation (18) is strict for some U if the individual
is strictly naive. Suppose, by contradiction, that Equation (18) is satisfied as an equality for
all u-upper sets. The arguments above imply that ν̂(U) = ν(U) for any (−u)-upper set U, i.e.,
by Theorem 7 that %ν̂ is more temptation-averse than %ν and vice versa. This implies that
Equation (17) is satisfied as an equality for all x, and therefore the system in Equation (16) only
contains equalities. In particular, U (x) = u(m(λx )) for all x, i.e., the individual is sophisticated.
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C.5

Proof of Corollary 6

Lemma 4. Suppose u and v are independent expected-utility functions, and define a function
g : [0, 1] → V by g(α) = αu + (1 − α)v.
1. Take any cumulative distribution functions F and F̂ on [0, 1], and define probability measures µ and µ̂ on V by µ ≡ F ◦ g −1 and µ̂ ≡ F̂ ◦ g −1 .37 If (u, v, F, F̂ ) is an uncertain
intensity Strotz representation of a preference (%, λ), then (u, µ, µ̂) is a random Strotz
representation of (%, λ).
2. Take any cumulative distribution functions F1 and F2 on [0, 1], and define probability
measures µ1 and µ2 on V by µi ≡ Fi ◦ g −1 . Then µ1 u µ2 if and only if F1 ≥F OSD F2 .
Proof. (1): Note that by assumption % is represented by
Z

1

max{u(p) : p ∈ Bg(α) (x)} dF̂ (α).

U (x) =
0

By the standard change of variables formula, this implies
Z
U (x) =
max{u(p) : p ∈ Bṽ (x)} d(F̂ ◦ g −1 )(ṽ)
V
Z
=
max{u(p) : p ∈ Bṽ (x)} dµ̂(ṽ),
V

and hence (u, µ̂) is a random Strotz representation of %.
Note also that by assumption there exists, for each menu x, a measurable selection function
px : [0, 1] → x with px (α) ∈ Bu (Bg(α) (x)) for all α ∈ [0, 1] such that
λx (y) = F (p−1
x (y))
for all measurable y ⊂ x. Take any measurable selection function p̃x : V → x with p̃x (ṽ) ∈
Bu (Bṽ (x)) for all ṽ ∈ V that also satisfies px (α) = p̃x (g(α)) for all α ∈ [0, 1].38 Therefore, for
any measurable y ⊂ x,
−1
λx (y) = F (g −1 (p̃−1
x (y))) = µ(p̃x (y)),

and hence (u, µ) is a random Strotz representation of λ.
37

We are abusing notation slightly and using F to also denote the probability measure on [0, 1] that
has
R F as its distribution Rfunction. That is, for any measurable set A ⊂ [0, 1], we write F (A) to denote
dF (α). Thus µ(E) = {α0 :g(α0 )∈E} dF (α) for any measurable E ⊂ V.
A
38
To see that such a selection function p̃x exists, fix any measurable selection function p̂x : V → x with
p̂x (ṽ) ∈ Bu (Bṽ (x)) for all ṽ ∈ V. Let V̄ = g([0, 1]) ⊂ V. When the codomain of g is restricted to V̄, i.e.,
g : [0, 1] → V̄, this function is a bijection. Now define p̃x (ṽ) = px (g −1 (ṽ)) for ṽ ∈ V̄ and p̃x (ṽ) = p̂x (ṽ)
for ṽ ∈
/ V̄.
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(2): Suppose µi ≡ Fi ◦ g −1 for i = 1, 2 and µ1 u µ2 . Fix any α ∈ [0, 1], and let
U = {v 0 ∈ V : v 0 u αu + (1 − α)v}. By construction, U is a u-upper set, so µ1 (U) ≥ µ2 (U). In
addition, g −1 (U) = [α, 1]. Therefore,
F1 ([α, 1]) = µ1 (U) ≥ µ2 (U) = F2 ([α, 1]).
Since this is true for all α ∈ [0, 1], F1 ≥F OSD F2 .
Conversely, suppose F1 ≥F OSD F2 . Fix any u-upper set U. Note that for any 0 ≤ α ≤ α0 ≤
1, we have g(α0 ) u g(α) and hence
g(α) ∈ U =⇒ g(α0 ) ∈ U.
This implies that the set g −1 (U) is an interval from some α∗ ∈ [0, 1] to 1.39 Therefore,
µ1 (U) = F1 (g −1 (U)) ≥ F2 (g −1 (U)) = µ2 (U).
Since this is true for all u-upper sets, µ1 u µ2 .



Turning now to the proof of Corollary 6, suppose (%, λ) has an uncertain intensity Strotz
representation (u, v, F, F̂ ). Define g as in Lemma 4 for u and v, define measures µ ≡ F ◦ g −1
and µ̂ ≡ F̂ ◦ g −1 on V. By part 1 of Lemma 4, (u, µ, µ̂) is a random Strotz representation for
(%, λ). Therefore, by Theorem 3 together with part 2 of Lemma 4, the individual is naive if
and only if F̂ ≥F OSD F (and is sophisticated if and only if F̂ = F ).

C.6

Proof of Corollary 7

Suppose (%1 , λ1 ) and (%2 , λ2 ) are naive and have uncertain intensity Strotz representations
(u, v, F1 , F̂1 ) and (u, v, F2 , F̂2 ). Define g as in Lemma 4 for u and v, define measures µi ≡ Fi ◦g −1
and µ̂i ≡ F̂i ◦ g −1 on V. By part 1 of Lemma 4, (u, µi , µ̂i ) is a random Strotz representation
for (%i , λi ) for i = 1, 2. The result follows from applications of Theorems 4 and 5, respectively,
together with part 2 of Lemma 4.

C.7

Proof of Corollaries 4 and 5

A maximally present-biased preference only values immediate consumption in period 1 and
ignores all subsequent consumption, which is equivalent to the extreme case where β = 0:
v0 (c) = w(c1 ). Any convex combination of the virtuous utility u and maximally present-biased
v0 can be rewritten as the following familiar formula:
βu(c) + (1 − β)v0 (c) = w(c1 ) + β

∞
X

δ t−1 w(ct ) = vβ (c).

t=2
39

That is, it is equal to either (α∗ , 1] or [α∗ , 1], where α∗ = inf g −1 (U).
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Therefore, uncertainty about the present-bias parameter β simply parameterizes uncertainty
about the intensity of u relative to v0 , and β is the relative weighting of exponential discounting versus extreme impatience. Thus an RQH representation (w, F, F̂ , δ) can equivalently be
expressed as an uncertain intensity Strotz representation (u, v0 , F, F̂ ). With this observation,
the results follow directly from Corollaries 6 and 7 in Appendix B.
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Supplementary Appendix for

Behavioral Characterizations of naivete for
Time-Inconsistent Preferences
Abstract
Theorem 7 from Appendix A of the main paper is an extension of the characterization of comparative temptation aversion from Dekel and Lipman (2012):
While their result required a finite consumption space, our extension applies to any
random Strotz representation defined on any compact and metrizable consumption
space C, provided the measure in the representation has finite-dimensional support.
As discussed in the paper, this extension is important for a number of applications,
including dynamic consumption decisions where C is a set of infinite consumption
streams. In this supplement, we provide a proof of Theorem 7.

S.1
S.1.1

Proof of Theorem 7
Sufficiency: more temptation averse =⇒ less u-aligned

The following is the relevant result from Dekel and Lipman (2012), which they proved
for the case of finite C.
Theorem S.1 (Dekel and Lipman (2012)). Suppose C has finite cardinality. Suppose
%1 and %2 have random Strotz representations (u, µ1 ) and (u, µ2 ). Then %2 is more
temptation averse than %1 if and only if µ1 u µ2 .
Proof. Theorem 4 in Dekel and Lipman (2012) establishes the equivalence of %2 being
more temptation averse than %1 and another condition on the representations that they
refer to as conditional dominance. However, they also establish that µ1 u µ2 as an
intermediate step in their proof.40 The equivalence asserted in Theorem S.1 is also stated
explicitly in Theorem 4 of their working paper, Dekel and Lipman (2010).41

40

To show that %2 being more temptation averse that %1 implies µ1 u µ2 , the relevant results in
Dekel and Lipman (2012) are the following: Lemma 3 shows that a partial order vCu v 0 used in their
paper is equivalent to our order v u v 0 (ignoring their normalization of utility functions). Lemmas 4,
5, and 6 and the arguments on page 1296 show that for any set W that is closed under Cu (is a u-upper
set in our terminology), µ1 (W ) ≥ µ2 (W ).
41
Dekel and Lipman (2010) impose a normalization on the set of utility functions used in their result.
However, by the uniqueness properties of the random Strotz representation established in Theorem 3
of Dekel and Lipman (2012), the probability of any u-upper set is the same for any random Strotz
representation of the same preference. Therefore, their normalization of utilities is inconsequential for
the result.
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To prove the sufficiency part of Theorem 7, we now show that the sufficiency direction
in Theorem S.1 can be extended to any compact and metrizable space C and any random
Strotz representations (u, µ1 ) and (u, µ2 ) defined on that space, subject to our restriction
that each µi has finite-dimensional support. Our approach is to show that the relationship
between µ1 and µ2 , specifically µ1 u µ2 , can be inferred from looking at the restriction
of the representations and preferences to a carefully chosen finite consumption space
C ∗ ⊂ C.
The following preliminary result will be useful in the sequel. Recall that V denotes
the set of all continuous functions v : C → R, i.e., the set of all expected-utility functions.
Lemma S.1. Suppose the set {v1 , . . . , vn } ⊂ V is linearly independent. Then there
exists a finite subset C ∗ ⊂ C such that the set {v1∗ , . . . , vn∗ } is linearly independent, where
vi∗ = vi |C ∗ is the restriction of the function vi to C ∗ .
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that for every finite B ⊂ C, the collection {v1 |B , . . . , vn |B }
is linearly dependent. Then for any finite B ⊂ C, the set AB ⊂ Rn defined by
AB = {α ∈ Rn : kαk = 1 and α1 v1 (c) + · · · + αn vn (c) = 0 ∀c ∈ B}
is nonempty. Note that AB is also a closed subset of the unit ball in Rn , which is itself
compact because n is finite. Let B denote the set of all nonempty finite subsets of C.
For any B1 , . . . , Bk ∈ B, we have
AB1 ∩ · · · ∩ ABk = AB1 ∪···∪Bk 6= ∅,
since B1 ∪ · · · ∪ Bk is finite and hence also in B. Thus the collection {AB }B∈B has the
finite intersection property. Since these sets are closed subsets of a compact set, this
T
implies B∈B AB 6= ∅. However, since
\

AB = {α ∈ Rn : kαk = 1 and α1 v1 (c) + · · · + αn vn (c) = 0 ∀c ∈ C},

B∈B

this implies the set {v1 , . . . , vn } is linearly dependent, a contradiction.



Since µ1 and µ2 have finite-dimensional support, there exists a finite set of expectedutility functions {v1 , . . . , vn } ⊂ V such that supp(µi ) ⊂ span({v1 , . . . , vn }) for i = 1, 2.
Consider the set of function {u, 1, v1 , . . . , vn }, where 1 denotes the constant function
with 1(c) = 1 for all c ∈ C. Without loss of generality, assume that this set of functions
is linearly independent. Otherwise, we can sequentially remove the functions vi until
we obtain a linearly independent set.42 To simplify notation in what follows, let Vs ≡
span({u, 1, v1 , . . . , vn }) ⊂ V. Thus µ1 (Vs ) = µ2 (Vs ) = 1.
42

Note that the set {u, 1} must be linearly independent since u assumed to be nontrivial (i.e., not
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Take C ∗ as in Lemma S.1 for the set {u, 1, v1 , . . . , vn }. Let V ∗ denote the set of
all continuous real-valued functions on C ∗ and let Vs∗ ≡ span({u∗ , 1∗ , v1∗ , . . . , vn∗ }) ⊂ V ∗ ,
where u∗ = u|C ∗ , 1∗ = 1|C ∗ , and vi∗ = vi |C ∗ . Note that each of the functions u∗ , v1∗ , . . . , vn∗
must be nontrivial (i.e., not constant) since function 1∗ together with these functions
forms a linearly independent set.
Lemma S.2. Define a function g : Vs → Vs∗ by g(v) = v|C ∗ , and define a measure µ∗i on
V ∗ by µ∗i (E) = µi (g −1 (E)) for any measurable set E ⊂ V ∗ for i = 1, 2.43
1. The function g is a homeomorphism. That is, g is bijection and both g and its
inverse function g −1 are continuous.
2. For any measurable set E ⊂ V, µi (E) = µ∗i (g(E ∩ Vs )).
3. For any proper u-upper set U in V (i.e., U ( V), the set U ∗ = g(U ∩ Vs ) is a
u∗ -upper set in V ∗ .
4. Let %∗i denote the restriction of %i to sets of lotteries with support in C ∗ , which we
can identify with the set K(∆(C ∗ )). Then (u∗ , µ∗i ) is a random Strotz representation
for %∗i for i = 1, 2.
Proof. (1): This is a standard application of the fundamental theorem of linear algebra
for finite-dimensional vector spaces. Note that g is a linear function from the linear
space Vs with basis vectors {u, 1, v1 , . . . , vn } to the linear space Vs∗ with basis vectors
{u∗ , 1∗ , v1∗ , . . . , vn∗ }. Since g maps each basis vector for Vs to the corresponding basis
vector for Vs∗ and the number of basis vectors is the same for each space, g is a bijection.
Since any linear function between finite-dimensional spaces is continuous, both g and g −1
are continuous.44
(2): Fix any measurable set E ⊂ V. Then
µi (E) = µi (E ∩ Vs ) = µi (g −1 (g(E ∩ Vs ))) = µ∗i (g(E ∩ Vs )),
constant). Moreover, if span{u, 1} = span{u, 1, v1 , . . . , vn }, then the support of the measures in the
random Strotz representations (u, µi ) must assign all probability to the set of affine transformations of
u. In this case, the representations reduce to time-consistent expected-utility maximization, and we have
µ1 ≈ µ2 . Except in this trivial case, the linearly independent set of expected-utility functions whose
span contains the support of µi must contain u, 1, and at least some of the vi functions.
43
In the definition of µ∗i , we are implicitly treating g as a function from Vs into V ∗ . We could
equivalently define µ∗i by µ∗i (E) = µi (g −1 (E ∩ Vs∗ )).
44
A more detailed argument is as follows: Define h : Rn+2 → Vs by h(α) = α1 v1 +· · ·+αn vn +αn+1 u+
αn+2 1 and define h∗ : Rn+2 → Vs∗ by h∗ (α) = α1 v1∗ + · · · + αn vn∗ + αn+1 u∗ + αn+2 1∗ . By the linear
independence of these sets of functions, both h and h∗ are bijections. It is trivial that both functions are
continuous, and by Aliprantis and Border (2006, Corollary 5.24) both h−1 and h∗−1 are also continuous.
Note that g = h∗ ◦ h−1 and g −1 = h ◦ h∗−1 , and hence these functions are continuous.
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where the first equality follows from µi (Vs ) = 1, the second follows from g −1 (g(E ∩ Vs )) =
E ∩ Vs (which holds because g is a bijection), and the third follows from the definition
of µ∗i .
(3): First observe that for any v, v 0 ∈ Vs ,
v ≈ v 0 ⇐⇒ v = av 0 + b1 for some a > 0, b ∈ R
⇐⇒ g(v) = ag(v 0 ) + b1 for some a > 0, b ∈ R

(S.1)

0

⇐⇒ g(v) ≈ g(v ).
Now fix any proper u-upper set U in V, and let U ∗ = g(U ∩ Vs ). To see that U ∗ is
a u∗ -upper set, fix any v ∗ ∈ U ∗ and v ∗0 ∈ V ∗ with v ∗0 u∗ v ∗ . We need to show that
v ∗0 ∈ U ∗ . Let v = g −1 (v ∗ ) ∈ U ∩ Vs . Note that we cannot have v ∗ ≈ −u∗ , as this would
imply by Equation (S.1) that v ≈ g −1 (−u∗ ) = −u, which would in turn imply by the
definition of a u-upper set that U = V, contradicting our assumption that U is a proper
subset of V. Therefore, there exists some α ∈ [0, 1] such that
v ∗0 ≈ αu∗ + (1 − α)v ∗ .
Thus there exist a > 0 and b ∈ R such that
v ∗0 = aαu∗ + a(1 − α)v ∗ + b1∗ .
Let
v 0 = aαu + a(1 − α)v + b1.
Clearly v 0 ∈ Vs . Moreover, since v 0 u v we have v 0 ∈ U. Thus v 0 ∈ U ∩ Vs , which implies
v ∗0 = g(v 0 ) ∈ U ∗ .
(4): We can treat a lottery p ∈ ∆(C ∗ ) as a measure defined only on the space C ∗ , or
we treat this as a lottery in ∆(C) that assigns probability zero to the set C \ C ∗ . Thus
we will abuse notation slightly and evaluate the lotteries p ∈ ∆(C ∗ ) using both functions
in V ∗ and functions in V. Note that for any v ∈ Vs , v(p) = v ∗ (p) for v ∗ = g(v) ∈ Vs∗ .
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Therefore, for any x ∈ K(∆(C ∗ )),
Z
∗
Ui (x) =
max u∗ (p) dµ∗i (v ∗ )
p∈B
∗
v ∗ (x)
ZV
=
max u∗ (p) d(µi ◦ g −1 )(v ∗ )
p∈B
∗
v ∗ (x)
ZVs
=
max u∗ (p) dµi (v)
p∈B
g(v) (x)
ZVs
max u(p) dµi (v)
=

(definition of µ∗i )
(change of variables)

Vs p∈Bv (x)

= Ui (x).
Thus Ui∗ is the restriction of Ui to K(∆(C ∗ )). Also, note that µ∗i is nontrivial (i.e., assigns
probability zero to the set of constant functions) since
µ∗i ({α1∗ : α ∈ R}) = µi (g −1 ({α1∗ : α ∈ R})) = µi ({α1 : α ∈ R}) = 0,
by the nontriviality of µi . Hence (u∗ , µ∗i ) is a random Strotz representation of %∗i .



We now prove that µ1 u µ2 . By assumption, %2 is more temptation averse than %1 .
Thus for any menu x and lottery p, {p} 1 x implies {p} 2 x. This implies a fortiori
that the same condition must hold for lotteries and menus of lotteries with support in
C ∗ , and hence %∗2 is more temptation averse than %∗1 , where %∗i is defined as in part 4
of Lemma S.2. Since C ∗ is finite and (u∗ , µ∗i ) represents %∗i for i = 1, 2, Theorem S.1
implies that µ∗1 u∗ µ∗2 .
Now fix any u-upper set U in V. If U = V, then trivially µ1 (U) = µ2 (U) = 1.
Otherwise, by part 3 of Lemma S.2, g(U ∩ Vs ) is a u∗ -upper set in V ∗ and therefore
µ1 (U) = µ∗1 (g(U ∩ Vs )) ≥ µ∗2 (g(U ∩ Vs )) = µ2 (U),
where the equalities follow from part 2 of Lemma S.2 and the inequality follows from
µ∗1 u∗ µ∗2 . Since this is true for any u-upper set U, conclude that µ1 u µ2 .

S.1.2

Necessity: less u-aligned =⇒ more temptation averse

In this section we prove that the more temptation averse comparative is implied by
µ1 u µ2 . It is worth noting that the proof of this direction does not rely on the
assumption that these measures have finite-dimensional support.
The following preliminary result will be useful.
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Lemma S.3. Let u, v, v 0 be expected-utility functions defined on ∆(C), and suppose v u
v 0 . Then for any menu x,
max u(p) ≥ max u(q).
p∈Bv (x)

q∈Bv0 (x)

Proof. If v 0 ≈ −u, then for any menu x,
max u(q) = min u(q) ≤ u(p), ∀p ∈ x.
q∈x

q∈Bv0 (x)

In particular,
max u(q) ≤ max u(p).
q∈Bv0 (x)

p∈Bv (x)

If we do not have v 0 ≈ −u, then v u v 0 implies v ≈ αu + (1 − α)v 0 for some α ∈ [0, 1].
First, consider α = 0. In this case, v ≈ v 0 . Therefore Bv (x) = Bv0 (x), which implies
max u(p) = max u(q).
q∈Bv0 (x)

p∈Bv (x)

Finally, consider the case of α > 0. Note that for any menu x and any p ∈ Bv (x) and
q ∈ Bv0 (x),
αu(p) + (1 − α)v 0 (p) ≥ αu(q) + (1 − α)v 0 (q) and v 0 (q) ≥ v 0 (p).
Since α > 0, these inequalities imply u(p) ≥ u(q). Therefore,
max u(p) ≥ max u(q),
p∈Bv (x)

q∈Bv0 (x)

as claimed.



Suppose (u, µ1 ) and (u, µ2 ) are random Strotz representations of %1 and %2 , and
suppose µ1 u µ2 . Fix any menu x, and let [a, b] = u(x). Define fx : V → [a, b] by
fx (v) = max u(p).
p∈Bv (x)

By Lemma S.3, v u v 0 implies fx (v) ≥ fx (v 0 ). Therefore, for any α ∈ [a, b] and v u v 0 ,
v 0 ∈ fx−1 ([α, b]) ⇐⇒ fx (v 0 ) ≥ α =⇒ fx (v) ≥ α ⇐⇒ v ∈ fx−1 ([α, b]).
Thus fx−1 ([α, b]) is a u-upper set. Therefore,
µ1 (fx−1 ([α, b])) ≥ µ2 (fx−1 ([α, b])).
6

Define distributions ηix ≡ µi ◦ fx−1 on [a, b] for i = 1, 2. By the preceding arguments, η1x
first-order stochastically dominates η2x . Therefore, by the change of variables formula,
Z
U1 (x) =

Z
fx (v) dµ1 (v) =

V

b

α dη1x (α)

Z
≥
a

a

b

α dη2x (α)

Z
=

fx (v) dµ2 (v) = U2 (x).
V

Since this is true for every x, and using the fact that U1 ({p}) = U2 ({p}) for any lottery
p, it follows immediately that %2 is more temptation averse than %1 .
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